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FOREIGN TRADE AND MANUFACTURING, 1860 
1. General Statistics 
Baltimore in 1860 was the nation's fourth city, with a population 
of 212,418--well behind New York, Philadelphia, and Brooklyn, but comfor-
tably ahead of Boston, New Orleans, Cincinnati, and St. Louis. One-
fourth of the city's inhabitants were foreign-born, chiefly Ger.man and 
Irish; one-eighth were free Negroes; one per cent were slaves.1 Together 
with its environs, Baltimore comprised over one-third of the population 
of Maryland, and had already become the financial, cormnercial, and man-
ufacturing center of the Chesapeake Bay region and its hinterland. The 
city sprawled around the estuaries of the Patapsco River at tidewater, 
pushing more and more wharves into the Northwest Branch and edging re-
lentlessly, after the manner of cities, into the once-rural areas of 
lower Baltimore County. Already, in 1860, the factory chimney was taking 
its place in the Baltimore skyline along with the black spars and the 
counting-house, but the city was then, as always, a seaport, and her 
other activities owed their existence to the nineteen feet of channel--
at mean low water2--which connected the Basin and Harbor, in the North-
west Branch, with Chesapeake Bay. 
1u. s. Bureau of the Census, Eighth Census of the United States, 
1860. Vol. I, ~ufacturing (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
1865), pp. 214, 611. The population broke down as follows: iVhite, 
184520, including 52,497 foreign-born (32,613 German and 15,536 Irish); 
free Negro, 25,680; slave, 2,218. 
2J. Thomas Scharf, Histo of Baltimore Cit and Count (Philadel-
phia: Louis H. Everts, 1881 , P• 289. The process of deepening the 
channel to a minimum depth of 22 feet had been going on for same time, 
rather slowly, but the war postponed completion of the task. 
1 
2 
It was a big port, and a busy one. Four ships a day, on the aver-
age, arrived from or cleared for foreign harbors during 1860,3 and the 
total value of Baltimore's foreign trade in that year exceeded 
$21,000,000.4 The figures since 1856, the record year for the pre-war 
period, show that the city was near~ recovered from the Panic of 1857, 
and reveal a slight and fairly consistent excess of exports over im-
ports. 
TABLE 1 
ANNUAL VALUE OF IMPORTS AND EXPORTS, 1856-1860 
(in millions of dollars)* 
Year Imports Exports 
1856 •••••• 10.1 13.3 
1857 ...... ll.O 11.4 
1858 •••••• 7-9 10.2 
1859 •••••• 10.4 8.7 
1860 •••••• 10.2 10.9 
*Source: Baltimore Board of Trade, Eleventh An-
nual Report •• •z 1860 (Baltimore: 
Rose & Co., 1860), p. 51. 
Baltimore had the best balance of all the major ports, as the fol-
lowing table indicates, but her total volume of trade was considerab~ 
behind that of Boston, New Orleans, and that perennial champion, New 
York. 
3compiled from the Reading Room Record Books of the Baltimore Mer-
chants' Exchange. (Hereafter cited as ~.) These volumes, con-
taining a daily record of arrivals and clearances, are in the Maryland 
Historical Society, Baltimore, Maryland. 
4Baltimore Board of Trade, 
and Directors, 1860 (Baltimore: 
cited as BBOT.) 
Eleventh Annual Re ort of the President. 
Rose & Co., 18 0 , p. 51. Hereafter 
3 
TABLE 2 
VALUE OF FOREIGN TRADE, 1860, BY CHIEF PORTS 
(in millions of dollars )~r 
Port Imports Exports Total 
New York 233.6 120.6 354.2 
New Orleans 22.9 107.8 130.7 
Boston 39-3 13.5 52.8 
Baltimore 10.2 10.9 21.1 
Philadelphia 14.6 5·5 20.1 
~~ources: u. s. 36th Congress, 2nd Sess., Senate Ex. 
Doc. 1087, Vol. VIII, ~port of the Secre-
tary of the Treasury on the Commerce and 
Navi ation of the United States for the 
Year ending June 30, 18 0 Washington: 
George Vl. Bowman, 1860). Hereafter cited 
as Report on Conm1erce and Navigation. 
See also BBOT, 1860, p. 51. 
2. Imports 
Of the many items in Baltimore's list of imports, by far the most 
important were coffee and sugar.5 The coffee intake in 1860 was v-dlued 
at $3,291,000, and the sugar at $3,043,000, the two products together 
comprising more than sixty per cent of the city's total imports. The 
bulk of the coffee came from Rio de Janeiro, with Pernambuco and a few 
lesser Brazilian ports supplying the remainder. This trade, which 
dated back to the early 1800's and had been increasing steadily since 
1823, employed a large fleet of stur~, tall-masted barks in the long 
"up-and-down" voyage between Rio and the Chesapeake. Baltimore ranked 
behind New York and New Orleans in the importation of coffee, and was 
5see Appendix, Table 5, for a list of Baltimore's principal imports. 
4 
losing ground proportionately, but continued to possess a large, well-
established share of the total business. 6 The sources of the sugar 
were more varied, although Cuba, Porto Rico, and other islands in the 
tvest Indies furnished a growing majority, followed by Demerara (British 
Guiana), Brazil, Manila, and Louisiana. 7 New York, receiving two-thirds 
of the nation's sugar imports, probably did not consider Baltimore's 
thriving trade as serious competition. 8 
Compared with coffee and sugar, Balt:imore's other imports were less 
significant. High on the list of "secondary items,n and important in 
its own department, was copper ore. Coming principally from Chile and 
Cuba, and to a lesser extent from Peru and the 1vest Indies, more than 
$600,000 worth of the reddish ore was received by the city's two large 
copper smelting companies in 1860. This figure represented nearly half 
of the nationa~ import, but the manufacture of copper in other areas 
depended more upon domestic ores. Following copper on Baltimore's list 
was iron and its various manufactures, coming chiefly, as-. ID.ight be ex-
pected, from Cardiff and the other British iron ports. Railroad iron, 
bar iron, unspecified manufactures, and pig iron made up ninety per cent 
of the $450,000 receipts. As in so many instances, New York led the 
field in this department, receiving three-fifths of the foreign-made 
iron, while Boston, New Orleans, and Philadelphia took most of the 
6Frank R. Rutter, South American Trade of Baltimore, Johns Hopkins 
University Studies in History and Political Science, Fifteenth Series, 
IX (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1897), p. 32. 
7BBOT, 1860, PP• 40-41. 
and Manila came to Baltimore 
8see Appendix, Table 7, 
of the major cities. 
Most of the sugar from Louisiana, Brazil, 
via Northern ports. 
for a comparison of the principal imports 
5 
balance. 
Baltimore's share in the importation of textiles was negligible. 
The receipts of cotton goods, valued at $275,000 in 1860 and consisting 
chiefly of piece goods and hosiery, were dwarfed by the flow of manu-
factured cotton to New York; the other major ports, although far behind 
New York, ranked considerably ahead of Baltimore. This story was even 
more pronounced in the case of woolens, which constituted the country's 
largest import--Baltimore's receipts amounted to $230,000, New York's 
to $34,000,000. As for silk goods, which ranked behind woolens and just 
ahead of cottons in value as a national import, New York's share was 
even greater, Baltimore's virtually non-existent.9 The greeqy city at 
the mouth of the Hudson likewise seized the lion's share of the $10,000,000 
fla~ and linen import, another item barely mentioned in the Baltimore 
figures. Cotton goods and woolens placed sixth and eighth, respectively, 
among Baltimore's imports, and therefore deserve notice as items in her 
foreign trade, but the heavy direct shipments from the looms and mills 
of Great Britain and western Europe went primarily to New York, sent 
lesser quantities to Boston, Philadelphia, and New Orleans, and favored 
Baltimore with the merest trickle. 
Conditions were vastly different in the guano trade. This valu-
able fertilizer, found in large quantities on the mainland of Peru and 
in many tiny islands off the Peruvian coast, was a major factor in the 
successful efforts at soil reclamation then under way in Virginia, 
9Report on Commerce and Navigation, pp. 489-491, values Baltimore's 
importation of silk and its manufactures at $1,900 for the fiscal year 
ending June 30, 1860; BBOT, 1860, p. 53, lists the receipts of silk for 
the calendar year at less than $1,000. 
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Mar,yland, and states farther south, and was shipped chiefly to Balti-
more for distribution to this growing Southern market.10 The Peruvian 
government held a monopoly on all the guano deposits under its juris-
diction, consigned it to two or three chosen houses in the United 
States, paid these houses a commission based on the proceeds from the 
sales, and fixed prices so as to make a $15 per ton profit.11 Using 
these figures to compute the value of Baltimore's guano imports, the 
receipts--50,000 tons in 1860--must have amounted to at least $750,000.12 
On the basis of tonnage, Baltimore led all of her rivals in the import-
ation of this aromatic but highly useful commodity, receiving sixty 
per cent of the total amount--a majority worthy of New York.13 
Another item of moderate importance was molasses, which came from 
the big sugar-producing areas in the West Indies and Demerara. Here 
again, Baltimore's share was comparatively small--a little over $250,000 
out of a $5,000,000 trade--but the molasses import was well divided 
among the leading ports, and the city was not hopelessly outdistanced 
by her rivals. Raw hides and skins, another Latin American product, 
were valued at $228,000 in Baltimore while the combined receipts in 
10Avery 0. Craven, Soil Exhaustion as a Factor in the Agricultural 
History of Virginia and Ma£Yland, 1606-1860, University of Illinois 
Studies in the Social Sciences, Vol. XIII, ¥arch, 1925 (Urbana, Ill.: 
University of Illinois, 1925), pp. 148 ff.; Rutter, op. cit., pp. 39, 
42-43, 49-
llRutter, op. cit., PP• 40-41, 49. 
12~., p. 49, n. 2. The low figures in the records--$233,672 in 
the Report on Commerce ~~d Navigation, and $154,621 in BBOT 1860--are 
based on the cost of loading the guano: $1.50 to $2.00 per ton. A far 
better estimate of the value of the guano import, as Rutter indicates, 
is obtained by using the profit per ton realized by the Peruvian govern-
ment. 
13ReEort on Commerce and Navigation, PP• 412-413. Baltimore re-
ceived more than twice as much gunao as her nearest competitor, N~T York. 
7 
New York and Boston, where the bulk of the trade had been permanently 
diverted after 1850,14 totaled more than $9,000,000. New York and New 
Orleans received three-fourths of the manufactured and unmanufactured 
tobacco shipped from abroad, with San Francisco running third and 
Baltimore a poor fourth. Her tobacco imports, coming chiefly from 
Cuba and Bremen, amounted to less than $220,000; most of Baltimore's 
tobacco-laden vessels were outward bound. 
A comparatively new and growing branch of Baltimore's trade was 
the importation of fruit from the Mediterranean. Although Baltimore 
business men looked forward to "a still further increase" in the 
foreign fruit trade,15 most of the vessels that cleared Palermo or 
Malaga with their cargoes of oranges, raisins, and lemons were bound 
for New York and Boston, the total receipts of fruit in these two ports 
amounting to nearly twenty times those of Baltimore. Other imports 
with a value in excess of $100,000 were salt and saltpeter, the major-
ity of it from Liverpool; earthen and willow wares from Great Britain 
and France; and fish, under the Reciprocity Treaty, from British North 
America. The combined importation of alcoholic beverages--wines, 
branqy, spirits, beer, ale, and porter--was valued at slightly less 
than $100,000. Burnt bone and bone dust from the La Plata River (the 
"River Plate," as it was known in maritime parlance), soda ash and 
like products from Great Britain, dolls and toys from northern Europe, 
non-woolen rags from the Italian states, hair from South America and 
14autter, op. cit., p. 25. 
15 BBOT, 1860, P• 28. 
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mohair from Britain and Germany, cocoa from Venezuela and the West 
Indies, and palm oil from Africa, round out the items worth mentioning. 
3. Exports 
If sugar and coffee were the giants among Baltimore's imports, 
her export trade was equally overshadowed by tobacco and flour. Am.er-
ica's principal exports during the 1850's were cotton, specie and bul-
lion, together comprising two-thirds of the total value of exports in 
. 16 
1860. Most of the cotton was shipped from New Orleans and the other 
cotton ports--Mobile, Charleston, and Savannah--and nearly all of the 
specie and bullion was shipped from New York; shipments of these com-
modities from Baltimore were ins:i_gnificant.17 But in tobacco and 
flour, which ranked third and fourth on the national export list, Bal-
timore occupied a strong position. Nearly $4,000,000 worth of tobacco 
cleared Baltimore during 1860, in vessels bound for Holland, the German 
ports, England, France, and Spain. The city trailed New Orleans but 
ran well ahead of New York and the other ports, and exported more than 
twenty per cent of the national total. In the flour trade Baltimore 
shipped roughly fifteen per cent, or 400,000 barrels with a value of 
$2,100,000. Brazil and the West Indies were her two largest customers, 
each taking one-third, with Britain and British North America receiving 
most of the balance. Baltimore was second to New York as an exporter 
of flour, comfortably outranking Richmond, Philadelphia, and Boston. 
In value, tobacco and flour made up three-fifths of Baltimore's exports. 
16see Appendix, Table 8, for a comparison of the principal exports 
of the major cities. 
17see Appendix, Table 6, for a list of Baltimore's principal 
exports. 
9 
'V-iheat was the third commodity. In the latter half of the year, 
a sudden~ increased demand from Great Britain sent ship after ship 
up the Chesapeake to fill her hold \vith grain; by December 31, over 
half a million bushels, valued at near~ ~?850,000, had cleared Balti-
more for Liverpool, London, and other points in the British Isles. 
Some $50,000 worth of biscuit and bread rounded out the export of 
wheat and its products. Following wheat and wheat flour came corn and 
corn meal--at a respectful distance, but fairlY important nonetheless, 
with a combined export value of near~ ~p500,000. Rice, valued at less 
than $100,000, and an unimportant quantity of rye, rye meal, and bar-
ley, made up the rest of the trade in grains. Great Britain, British 
North America, and Cuba consumed the bulk of the corn meal; British 
North America, Porto Rico, and the smaller islands in the 't!fest Indies 
took most of the corn; and Cuba, Bremen, and Britain consigned most of 
the cargoes of rice. New York, as usual, led in the export of most of 
the grain products, but Baltimore's share of the trade was substantial 
and, in the aggregate, larger than that of her other rivals. 
New York and Boston exported four-fifths of American cotton manu-
factures, leaving Baltimore in third place with a modest five per cent. 
Altogether, including white, printed, and colored cloth, cotton duck, 
and other manufactures, Baltimore's export of cotton goods was valued 
at $565,000--one more set of items for the hard-working schooners and 
stocky brigs to deliver in Valparaiso or Halifax or Havana or the 
River Plate, one more cargo for the holds of the tall barks and full-
rigged ships that rolled down to Rio on the coffee shuttle. 
Meat and other animal produce constituted a large and important 
group of American export commodities. The shipment of actual livestock 
10 
(horses, cattle, and hogs) was the least significant item in this cate-
gory, and was hardly practiced at all from the major Atlantic ports; 
Canada and the Maritime Provinces formed the only real market for live 
animals, hence Detroit, Vermont, and various small New England ports 
handled most of the trade.18 The most valuable animal exports were 
the so-called provisions--pork, beef, ham and bacon, butter, cheese, 
lard. Including tallow as well, Baltimore's total trade in animal pro-
ducts amounted to $850,000, mostly consigned to Cuba, Porto Rico, and 
the numerous small West Indian islands, where the master of a schooner, 
if he had something to sell, could load his vessel with sugar for the 
Chesapeake. In all of these products, New York enjoyed a lead that 
ranged from comfortable to commanding; Great Britain was usually the 
largest single market for provisions, and New York was eager to find 
goods that mjght help balance the westward flow of woolens, cottons, 
cutlery, and other English manufactures. Baltimore, however, vied on 
better terms with New Orleans, Boston, Portland, and Philadelphia for 
the runner-up position in the export of each commodity, and despite 
the enterprise of the New York merchants, there was enough trade left 
over to go around. 
Baltimore's export of wood and its manufactures, valued at nearly 
$400,000, included everything from household furniture and naval stores 
down to staves and heading, shingles, boards, oak bark, and plain 
lumber. In the export of general wood manufactures, New York, Portland, 
and Boston were far ahead, followed shortly by Philadelphia and, a dis-
tant fifth, Baltimore. New York and Boston dominated the household 
18
Report on Commerce and Navigation, pp. 322-323. Vermont's "sea-
ports" were, of course, on Lake Champlain. 
11 
furniture trade; New York and the New England ports shipped most of 
the boards, plank, scantling, and other lumber; New York, New Orleans, 
and Norfolk exported most of the staves and heading. North Caroljna, 
source of the naval stores, sent the greater part to New York and Bos-
ton for overseas shipment. Only in the oak bark trade (an important 
item in the tanning of leather), did Baltimore stand up among the 
leaders, and this branch of the wood export was relatively unimportant. 
Baltimore wood products probably found their chief markets in Cuba and 
the West Indies, which consumed the largest percentages of American 
timber and its manufactures; England, naturally, demanded the bulk of 
the naval stores. In 1860, Baltimore was not, comparatively speaking, 
an important center for the export of wood products.19 
The national export of adamantine and other candles was not large, 
totaling only a little over $700,000 in 1860. The chief customers were 
Cuba, Porto Rico, and the British vlest Indies, and Baltimore handled a 
sizeable share of the trade, finishing behind New York but ahead of 
the other major candle-exporters, Boston and Philadelphia. In the 
even smaller refined-sugar trade, Baltimore actually led the pack, 
shipping well over one-third of the total and enjoying, for once, a 
thumping fourteen-to-one advantage over New York. The greatest demand 
for refined sugar came from Chile, Brazil, British North America, 
Africa, Uruguay, and Argentina--an example of how far some of the 
original brown sugar from the cane-fields of Cuba and Porto Rico had 
l9Lumber was actually a big item in Baltimore's trade, but it 
figured almost entirely in domestic and interior trading. See below, 
pp • 38-39. 
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to travel before reaching the ultimate consumer. 
Although one of the most essential items in nineteenth century eco-
nomic activity was coal, the United States in lS60 exported less than 
200,000 tons; American mines were engaged primarily in supplying American 
furnaces, and the other major coal-using nations had more accessible 
sources of supply. Of the total shipment, valued at nearly $750,000, 
Baltimore exported about one-seventh and finished second only to New 
York. Various Great Lake ports, notably Cleveland and Oswego, handled 
the large Canadian demand; New York sent coal to China and the Maritime 
Provinces; and Baltimore supplied the familiar markets of Cuba and 
South America. Cuba was also the largest single market for American 
iron manufactures, but Baltimore's share of this $5,000,000 trade, in 
spite of her extensive dealings with Cuba, amounted to less than two 
per cent, and was dwarfed by the shipments from New York, Philadelphia, 
and Boston. 
J 
This brief synopsis of the foreign trade of Baltimore has shown, 
first of all, the great predominance of New York in almost every major 
commodity, a predominance that makes the thriving business in the other 
ports seem puny by comparison. Baltimore's own lines of trade were 
clearly marked. Aside from a large tobacco trade with Bremen, Holland, 
England, and France, and a sizeable export of wheat and flour to Great 
Britain, all of Baltimore's important maritime activity was connected 
with Latin America--the one area of successful competition with the 
Big City to the northward. Most of the flour, cotton goods, corn and 
corn meal, provisions, wood, coal, refined sugar, and candles that fol-
lowed tobacco as Baltimore's major exports found their way to the West 
13 
Indies, Brazil, and other ports south of the border. Those commodi-
ties for.med the return cargoes for the big trade in Latin American 
products on which Baltimore's foreign trade was based: sugar and mo-
lasses from the Indies and Demerara, coffee from Brazil, copper ore 
from Chile and Cuba, guano from Peru and a host of tiny islands, hides 
from the River Plate, "segars11 from Havana. European textiles and 
other manufactures, 1<1editerranean fruit, and the wood and wood products 
from the l~ritime Provinces and the west coast of Africa, were compara-
tively minor items. 
Even the big tobacco shipments to Europe had a Latin American 
twist. It was a complicated and roundabout triangular trade, evidently 
worked out as a rather laborious method of competing with New York's 
near-monopoly on the Atlantic shuttle. Tobacco-laden ships clearing 
Baltimore for Bremen or Rotterdam returned via Peru, doubtless selling 
European merchandise to the South Americans, and completed the triangle 
laden with guano for Baltimore.20 
\/ 
4. Manufacturing 
As a manufacturing center, Baltimore had an increasing but still 
moderate importance. The city and its environs contained forty per cent 
of the manufacturing establishments in Maryland, employed vrell over half 
of the invested capital, and turned out more than three-fourths of the 
20The existence of this tobacco-guano triangle was indicated by 
the ~· The volumes covering arrivals and clearances in 1860 showed 
that all of the vessels arriving with guano from Peru later cleared for 
Bremen or Holland. There were no clearances from Baltimore direct to 
Peru, and in the trade with northern Europe this was balanced by an 
excess of clearances over arrivals (involving Baltimore) at the German 
and Dutch ports. See Appendix, Tables 16 and 17. 
21 annual value of the products. The Baltimore area produced more during 
1860 than any Southern city, St. Louis included, and, indeed, more than 
any Southern state with the exception of Virginia. 22 On the other hand, 
Baltimore was far out-distanced by the large industrial centers in New 
England, Nev1 York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. The statistics on 
manufacturing reveal the tremendous difference between the South and 
the North at this time, and show that Baltimore, essentially a border 
city, would have added some twenty per cent to the South's total indus-
trial output but formed an insignificant fraction of the production in 
23 
the North. In the Chesapeake Bay area Baltimore was the only real 
manufacturing center, comfortably ahead of Richmond. 
Baltimore's most important industry, based on the annual value of 
the product, was the manufacture of men's clothing, in which 119 estab-
lishments turned out well over $3,000,000 worth of goods. 24 This figure 
trailed, but compared favorably with, the output of men's clothing in 
New York, Philadelphia, Cincinnati, and Massachusetts, and comprised a 
. 25 
little less than four per cent of the nation's $80,000,000 2ndustry. 
Second in value to the production of men's clothing, and to a certain 
extent connected with it, was Baltimore's $3,000,000 cotton textile 
industry, produced by eleven mills scattered through lower Baltimore 
21u. s. Eighth Census, 1860, Vol. III, Manufacturing, p. 228. 
22Ib.d . --1::......., passJ..m. 
23see Appendix, Table 9, for comparison of manufactures by sections. 
24see Appendix, Table 10, for list of Baltimore's principal manu-
factures. 
25see Appendix, Table 11, for a list of the principal manufactures 
of the United States by leading city or county industrial centers. 
15 
County and one within the city limits. 26 New England, of course, led 
in the production of cotton goods, and Baltimore's share was less than 
three per cent. 
Baltimore also contained forty-one mills for the grinding of flour 
and meal, an industry which :iil. 1860 was far and away the country's 
largest. It was not confined to big cities, nor to concentrated areas, 
but the Baltimore milling center was one of the most important--ahead 
of Philadelphia and New York, equal to Richmond, and only a short way 
behind Buffalo and St. Louis. 
At this time there were thirty-nine sugar refineries in the United 
States, turning out an annual product valued at over $42,000,000. New 
York's fourteen establishments were responsible for something less 
than half of this amount. If her refineries were approximately equal 
in size, Baltimore's two plants must have been among the largest in 
the nation, with a combined product worth $2,300,000.27 In any case, 
Baltimore's share of the sugar refining business was a substantial one. 
The iron factories in the Baltimore area turned out bar and sheet 
iron, castings and stoves, pig iron, blooms, bridges, and bedsteads; 
there were twenty-four establishments, and the combined value of the 
26The manufactures of Baltimore County have been considered, in 
this stuqy, as a part of the Greater Baltimore industrial area. 
27The Eighth Census only lists one sugar refinery in Baltimore, 
but Scharf, op. cit., P• 418, and the Baltimore Cit~ DirectoEr for 1860, 
camp. by J. G. Woods (Baltimore: J. G. Woods, 1861 , name two--the 
Baltimore and the I'furyland Steam Sugar Refining Companies. Shipping 
merchants Kirkland, Chase & Co., agents for the latter refinery, tempo-
rarily suspended in the fall of 1860, and their refinery may have 
ceased operations for a few weeks just as the Census was taken. 
16 
iron products was nearly $2,000,000. Pennsylvania had no rivals in 
the iron industry; New York was firmly in second place; and Maryland, 
with most of her iron-works in Baltimore, ranked fairly far down on the 
list. The area also possessed ten firms employed in the manufacture of 
machinery and steam engines, but once again the $1,500,000 annual pro-
duct lagged considerably behind those of New York, Pennsylvania, and 
other Northern states. 
Other industries of major importance were the beef, pork, and 
oyster-packing houses, whose annual product totaled $2,000,000; two 
copper smelting plants, which turned out more than one-fourth of the 
nation's copper; eleven carriage factories, forty furniture factories, 
and thirteen lumber mills; more than 250 boot and shoe establishments; 
twenty-one leather tanneries and two large tallow factories; ten soap 
and candle makers; 127 cigar-makers; four woolen textile mills; 2S dis-
tilleries and breweries; 37 fir.ms producing tin, copper, and sheet-
iron ware; sixteen shipbuilders and sixteen other establishments engaged 
in ship-smithing, sail and cordage making, etc.; sixty-eight bakeries; 
four manufacturers of agricultural implements; and forty-four brick-
making establishments. These industries, together with the previously 
mentioned cotton textile, men's clothing, flour, sugar, and iron pro-
ducers, accounted for nearly all of the value of the city's industrial 
products, employed most of the workers, and represented the bulk of 
the invested capital. 
The close connection between Baltimore's industry and her foreign 
trade is easily seen. In addition to meeting the local demand, the 
millers were turning out flour for the long voyage to the coffee plan-
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tations around Rio; the meat-packers were putting up beef and pork and 
ham and bacon for the brigs and schooners which returned from the West 
Indies with sugar for the Baltimore refineries. The copper smelting 
plants depended on the arrival of vessels laden with Chilean or Cuban 
ore, while ships with hides from the River Plate kept the tanneries at 
work, and the boot and shoe makers liked busy tanneries. Latin Ameri-
cans bought clothing, textiles, iron manufactures, tallow, and candles 
from BarGimore manufacturers. The firms engaged in preserving fruit 
watched for the ships from Malaga and Palenno. The various aspects of 
trade and industr.y seem to fall in place neatly, like the pieces of a 
puzzle. 
The pieces fit, but many are missing; the picture is only half-
drawn. There are important areas of Baltimore's economic activity for 
which the records are incomplete or non-existent or seldom looked at, 
yet which greatly modify, supplement, and complete the total picture.28 
These are the records of the domestic trade, of the goods that moved 
in and out of Baltimore by freight car, by canal boat and wagon, by 
steamboat and coasting schooner--the figures that reveal the source of 
Baltimore's exports and the ultimate destination of her imports. When 
this side of the story is evaluated, in so far as such an evaluation is 
possible, the city can be connected not only with foreign ports and 
28
The statistics and data in this chapter have been taken largely 
from carefully kept records which, if not entirely accurate in every 
instance, at least provide the closest measurement possible. The census 
gathered figures on the size, type, and number of manufacturing houses, 
and the customs-house counted the ships and valued the cargoes that 
moved to and from ports outside the United States. Any attempt to 
discover Baltimore's connection with other parts of the country must 
delve deeper into the records. 
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foreign products, but with various areas in the interior and along the 
coast. Only then will it be possible to gain a complete understanding 
of Baltimore's intricate commercial and manufacturing network. 
CHAPTER II 
llJ'TERIOR AND COASTWISE TRADE, 1S60 
1. Routes to the Interior 
The highways by which American seaports traded with other parts of 
the country before the Civil War included roads, canals, railroads, 
navigable rivers, and the ocean. In 1S60, statistics for produce ar-
riving in Baltimore by wagon are completely lacking. The city's Corn 
and Flour Exchange, in listing the annual receipts of grain, computed 
the totals arriving by rail and water, then simply added a flat ten 
per cent of this figure as "receipts per wagons.n1 Farmers and store-
keepers in Baltimore's immediate hinterland, unless situated con-
viently close to Chesapeake Bay or a rail line, naturally traded with 
the city by wagon, but long-distance wagon traffic could not compete 
with the railroad, the canal boat, the river steamer, or the coasting 
schooner where any of these methods of transit were available. Goods 
arriving by wagon, in the absence of figures, may be regarded as of 
minor importance, doubtless adding to the totals something like the 
ten per cent allotted by the Corn and Flour Exchange in the case of 
grain. The amount of produce arriving by wagon from any point beyond 
the local market was bound to be negligible. 
Unlike New Orleans, New York, and Mobile, Baltimore had no navi-
gable streams extending from her wharves into the interior, but Chesa-
peake Bay and its tributaries provided a more than adequate substitute. 
~altimore Corn and Flour Exchange, Sixth Annual Report of the 
President and Directors, 1S60 (Baltimore, 1S60), p. 11. 
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Steamboats and sailing craft connected Baltimore with every deep-water 
ar.m of the Bay--with the northeastern and southern sections of Maryland, 
with the Eastern Shore, with southern and eastern Virginia--and with 
the communities on the James, York, Potomac, and Rappahannock rivers. 
The Bay and its rivers had been influential in creating for Baltimore 
a large, varied, and expanding "local" market extending many miles from 
the forest of spars and rigging in the Northwest Branch. 
Chesapeake Bay also enabled Baltimore to claim the rank of terminus 
on two busy canals to the northward--the Chesapeake and Delaware, a 
thirteen 1nile link between the two bays, and the Susquehanna and Tide 
Water, which paralleled the Susquehanna into the Pennsylvania anthracite 
region. By the for.mer, Baltimore was moved many miles closer to Phila-
delphia and New York; by the latter, she was able to tap the resources 
of eastern and central Pennsylvania in successful competition with 
Philadelphia. 2 
As a rail center the city could afford to be proud of itself. The 
star, of course, was the Baltimore and Ohio, Baltimore's own railroad 
and vital link with the West. The B. & 0. could send its trains clat-
tering past Harper's Ferry and through the Appalachians clear to the 
Ohio River, where, at vllieeling, Benwood, and Parkersburg, tall side-
wheelers exchanged cargoes with the box cars, and trains across the 
river waited with produce from Illinois and the Lakes.3 A good 
2see James W. Livingood, The Philadelphia-Baltimore Trade RivalrY, 
17S0-1860 (Harrisburg: Pennsylvania Historical & MUseum Commission, 
1948), ch. III, esp. pp. 56 ff. This competent stu~ contains much 
valuable information about the economic development of eastern and cen-
tral Pennsylvania. 
3Edward Hungerford, The StorY of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, 
1827-1927 (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 192S), I, 264-267, 305. 
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connection with the grm~ing American Midwest had long been a necessity 
for the big Atlantic ports. During the 1850's, New York had built to 
.. 
Lake Erie at Buffalo and Dunkirk; Boston had finally gotten through to 
Albany and a connection with the recently organized New York Central; 
Philadelphia had pushed the Pennsylvania Railroad into Pittsburgh--and 
Baltimore had reached the Ohio at three points in western Virginia. 
The B. & 0. also gave the city a line to Washington, but the road's 
great value was as a highway between the seaboard and the trans-
Allegheny interior, and even before becoming a through route West it 
had done a tremendous service both for Baltimore and for the industries, 
farms, and towns in western Maryland and northwestern Virginia. 4 
The other major rail connections were with the North and East. 
The Northern Central, representing another Baltimore scheme to cut in 
on Philadelphia's backyard, 5 extended past York and Harrisburg to 
Sunbury--and anthracite coal. The line had several important junctions 
(notably one ~tith the Pennsylvania at Harrisburg), which enabled Balti-
more to approach a host of rich markets in territory not naturally her 
own. The Philadelphia, Wilmington & Baltimore Railroad was a major 
link in the chain of roads providing an all-rail route, of sorts, be-
tween Boston and Washington; by 1860, the P.W. & B. was building up 
its business in the shipment to New York and Philadelphia of Western 
produce brought to Baltimore by the B. & o., and thus securing a slice 
~ton Reizenstein, The Economic History of the Baltimore and 
Ohio Railroad, 1827-1853, Johns Hopkins University Studies in History 
and Political Science, Fifteenth Series, VII-VIII (Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins Press, 1897), PP• 72-77. 
5see Livingood, op. cit., ch. VI, esp. pp. 116, 139. 
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of valuable through freight traffic.6 Strict~ local lines li1 1860 
were the Western l•1aryland, reaching eighteen miles or so into the re-
gion west of the city; and the Annapolis & Elk Ridge, a Western Shore 
route that jo:ined the B. & o. at the Relay House, eight or ten miles 
from downtown Baltimore. 
2. The Coastwise Trade 
Baltimore's f:inal route to other American markets was traveled by 
the coasters, as the hundreds of vessels in this trade were called. 
They were not particularly different from their sisters in the foreign 
trade--some were built with shallower drafts, the better to navigate 
across the bars of Albemarle and Pimlico Sounds or into tiny Maine 
harbors; the average size was smaller than that of the overseas trader; 
but the multitude of schooners and the lesser fleets of brigs, barks, 
and ships that moved up and down the Atlantic coast l'lere simply all-
purpose sailing craft which, if duly registered, could and often did 
operate in both the foreign and coastwise trade.? 
It is possible only to approximate the relative volumes of foreign 
and coastwise shipping, but even the available data sho1.v that the usually 
neglected coasters more than pulled their weight in the maritime acti-
vity of Baltimore. 8 In 1860 the ~ferchantst Exchange recorded 632 
6philadelphia, Wilmington & Baltimore Railroad, Twenty-third Annual 
Report of the President & Directors to the Stockholders, 1860 (Phila-
delphia, 1861), p. 16. 
7 Only American ships were allowed to engage in the coastwise traf-
fic, however. Foreign ships occasionaD.y discharged a cargo in one 
American port and traveled up the coast to another in quest of a return 
load, but they were definitely barred from the coasting trade. 
8The ~ volumes provide the best source, supplemented by shipping 
news in the papers. The volumes, in addition to recording the daily 
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arrivals from foreign ports and 602 clearances for foreign ports,9 
with American vessels outnumbering foreign craft about two to one. 
During the same twelve months there were 2,123 coastwise arrivals and 
2,173 coastwise clearances, and these figures were by no means complete.10 
The following table of arrivals compares the figures kept by two dif-
ferent sources. 
TABLE 3 
TOTAL ARRIVALS, FOREIGN & COASTWISE, 1860 
Source Steamers Ships Barks Brigs Schooners Total 
BBOT •••• 510 121 190 287 1,318 2,426 
RRRB •••• 48la 122 202 286 1,670b 2,755 
asteamer arrivals in the ~ were supplemented by checking the 
lists in the Baltimore Price-Current for 1860. 
bThe big difference in the number of schooners is explained by 
the fact that the Board of Trade included n2 Bay craft in its 
computation of arrivals, while the RRRB reported the arrival of 
over 350 schooners from other Chesapeake Bay ports. See below, 
n. 10. 
arrivals and clearances, listed the name and type of ship, the master, 
the consignee or sender, and, in the case of incoming vessels, the cargo. 
9The foreign arrivals recorded by the RRRB for the calendar year 
1860 compare favorably with those listed in the Report on Commerce and 
Navigation, pp. 557, 561, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1860. 
(RRRB: 632 arrivals, 602 clearances; Report on Com. & Nav.: 617 arri-
vals, 593 clearances. The slight edge in the figures for the calendar 
year is accounted for by the greater exports of wheat to Britain and the 
larger imports of sugar from the West Indies that took place in the last 
six months of the year. Cf. BBOT, 1860, pp. 52-55, and Report on Com-
merce and Navigation, 1860, PP• 349, 499. 
lOrn the first place, the &.1:ffil3 made no attempt to report all of the 
arrivals and clearances for the immediate Bay area, although they noted 
several hundred. (See Appendix, Tables 16 and 17, for a breakdown of 
foreign and coastwise arrivals and clearances.) There were also omis-
sions in the ~ figures for steamships, which were partially remedied 
by checking the lists in the Baltimore Price-Current. Otherwise the 




Even with an incomplete count of the Bay craft, the figures seem 
to give the coasters a heavy majority. This advantage is more apparent 
than real, as a study of the relative sizes of the different types of 
ships will indicate. For the purpose of computation, an arbitrary ave-
rage tonnage has been given to each type, based on lists of typical 
vessels built during the 1830-1860 period.11 Ships were averaged at 
750 tons, barks at 325, brigs at 225, schooners at 100, and steamers 




Barks Brigs Schooners Steamers 
for (750 T) (325 T) (225 T) (100 T) (500 T) Total 
Foreign No. 96 137 204 157 9 603 
ports Tenn. 72,000 44,525 45,900 15,700 4,500 182,625 
Coastwise No. 16 66 80 1,540 1+71 2,173 
ports Tenn. 12,000 21,450 18,000 154,000 235,500 440,950 
i(-Source: RRRB, Vols. for 1860; Baltimore Price-Current, 1860. 
In numbers, the coastwise clearances had a seven to two edge over 
the foreign clearances; in tonnage, allowing for the greater number of 
large vessels--ships, barks, brigs--in the foreign trade, the coast-
wise margin was reduced to five to two. Even an approximation of the 
tonnage involved provides a better measurement of the actual volume of 
trade than the mere number of ships. But in any case, even allowing 
llFor lists of various vessels' dimensions, see Robert G. Albion, 
The Rise of New York Port 181 -1860 (New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 
1939 , Appendix XVI, PP• 408-409; BBOT, 1860, P• 51; Fred E. Dayton, 
Steamboat Days (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Co., 1925), pp. 311, 




for error in the above estimates, it is fairly safe to say that Balti-
more did a much greater amount of trading with other American ports than 
with foreign countries; the coastwise trade should not be omitted if 
the full scope of the city's economic activity is under consideration. 
v Of equal significance is the breakdown of this coastwise traffic 
into its local, Northern, and Southern segments. The little coasting 
schooners and their larger brethren connected Baltimore with 156 American 
ports, from Galveston on the Gulf to Passamaquoddy on the Maine-New 
Brunswick border. In the Chesapeake Bay region it is a little difficult 
to isolate the local commerce from that going to farther points. Steamers 
shuttled back and forth on fairly regular schedules from Baltimore to 
Norfolk, Richmond, and occasionally to Fredericksburg and West Point and 
the Patuxent River, but the newspapers and Reading Roam Record Books were 
careless in reporting their departures and arrivals; they paid somewhat 
more attention to the many schooners connecting Baltimore with the 
major Bay ports--Richmond, Norfolk, Alexandria, Petersburg, Fredericks-
burg. The point is that steamer and schooner service to these towns 
did not necessarily mean local traffic, for they were all important 
railheads with lines extending into central and southwestern Virginia 
and the "South proper." Purely local traffic, for the most part, moved 
in sloops, bugeyes, pungies, and tiny schooners--typical Chesapeake Bay 
craft too small and too numerous to be noted in their constant coming 
and going.12 
12Maryland Historical Society, "Sailing Craft of the Chesapeake 
Bay" (Baltimore: Maritime Musewn of the Maryland Historical Society, 
1951). A small pamphlet containing brief descriptions and illustra-
tions of the various Bay craft. 
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Baltimore's trade with the North and South is more easily compared. 
Excluding Maryland ports from both categories, and including all Vir-
ginia ports with the South, there were 794 Southern arrivals and 899 
Southern clearances during 1860, as compared with 1,275 Northern ar-
rivals and 1,200 Northern clearances. The comparative tonnages, using 
the same arbitrary values for each type of vessel, indicate that the 
North led the South in clearances, 252,225 tons to 170,925, and in ar-
rivals, 263,575 to 158,000. Roughly sixty per cent of Baltimore's 
coastwise trade, then, was with Northern ports. 
The coasters were by no means all regular traders--i.e., they 
did not shuttle constantly back and forth between Baltimore and a 
given port. Many schooners came down to Baltimore from New York or 
Boston to discharge a cargo of dry goods or boots and shoes, picked up 
a cargo of oysters or provisions, and proceeded to Charleston for a 
load of cotton, or to North Carolina for naval stores, whence they 
returned directly to their original port. This triangular trade, with 
its slight variations, explains the excess of Northern arrivals over 
Northern clearances, while the reverse held true for Baltimore's Sou-
them trade. A few vessels also switched back and forth from the 
coastwise to the foreign trade, but most of them were employed with 
fair regularity between Baltimore and a given area--the various Maine 
ports, for instance, or the Hudson River towns. In addition to the 
spasmodically reported Bay steamers, there were regular steam packet 
lines from Baltimore to Philadelphia, New York, Boston, Charleston, 
Savannah, and--for a very brief period--Providence.l3 Sailing packet 
13Dayton, op. cit., pp. 316-317. The Providence service was oper-
ated at a loss for a few weeks during 1860, and abandoned until 1873. 
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lines supplemented the steamer service to these and other points, and 
the other coasters alternated between a shuttle and a search for prom-
ising markets, wherever they might be found. Among the individual 
ports, Baltimore had the heaviest traffic with New York and Boston, 
followed by Richmond, Philadelphia, Charleston, Providence, Savannah, 
Norfolk, and Portland. Now that the outlines of the coasting trade 
and the main routes of overland travel have been summarized, the pic-
ture can be fairly well completed by an examination of the scope and 
direction of Baltimore's total activity in each important commodity. > 
3. Principal Trades 
~ all estimates, the largest of the city's commercial interests 
$ 14 was the dry goods trade, with an annual business of 30,000,000. Dry 
goods included cottons, woolens, silks, and linens. The total value of 
Baltimore's manufacture and foreign importation of these materials 
during 1860 amounted to ~~4,000,000, but the source of the ~p26,000,000 
balance is not hard to find. It came in the coasters from Northern 
ports, their holds filled with all the various types and weaves of 
cloth from the mills of New England and Philadelphia and the warehouses 
at the foot of Manhattan. nschooner from New York--dry goods," "schoo-
ner from Boston--dry goods,1~ "schooner from Philadelphia--dry goods," 
repeated the shipping columns of the Baltimore Pride-Current, week 
after week. Many of these textiles, of course, were manufactured in 
Europe--in I~chester, Leeds, Lyons, Brussels; nevertheless they were 
14nPrincipal Trades of Baltimore, n Hunt's Merchants' I>iagazine and 
Commercial Review, XLII (May, 1860), 565; BBOT, 1860, p. 47. See Ap-
pendix, Table 18, for a list of the principal trades. 
2$ 
imported by Northern merchants and sent to Baltimore in Northern ves-
sels. Even though the ultimate source of the cotton manufactures was 
Southern (no attempt was made to break down these "dry goods" into 
their component cloths), the actual trade in the finished product, as 
far as Baltimore was concerned, represented chiefly a heavy tie with 
the North. Only the cotton for Baltimore's own mills, valued at 
~p2,600,000 and coming coastwise from Charleston, Savannah, and Mobile, 
or via B. & 0. from the Southwest, could be called an undiluted Sou-
thern Connection. 
The destination of these dry goods is harder to pin-point. Aside 
from meeting a substantial local demand and shipping a moderate quan-
tity (:~500,000) abroad, most of the trade was with ''t'lfestern and South-
1rJestern states, and nearby Virginia and North Carolina. n15 The trade 
in dry goods with the "South proper," the Board of Trade went on, 
rather sadly, "has always been limited, notwithstanding our geographi-
cal and political connection with them.n16 Hunt's Merchants' :£1-Iagazine 
sounded a brighter note for the Southern dry goods connection, announc-
ing that improved transportation facilities plus na succession of good 
crops," which had enabled Southerners ttto meet their indebtedness more 
promptly, n was resulting in an increasing volume of trade with this 
section.17 The Baltimore & Ohio shipped 13,000 tons of dry goods to 
15BBOT, 1860, P• 47• 
16Ibid. 
17nPrincipal Trades of Balt:i.more,n op. cit., p. 565. 
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the Ohio River, and 7,000 tons t~ points east of the Ohio; 18 1,300 addi-
tional tons went from Baltimore to Pittsburgh via the Northern Central 
and Pennsylvania railroadsf9 This merely indicates a market somewhere 
away from the Atlantic seaboard, since the Ohio River was a gateway to 
the West, Northwest, and Southwest alike. The most important markets 
for Baltimore textiles, then, can rather vaguely be summed up as Western, 
Southern, and local. 
Baltimore by 1860 was a large and growing center for the manufac-
turing and marketing of ready-made clothing, chiefly men's, a business 
which was valued at $7,000,000 annually. Three million dollars of this 
figure was actually made in Baltimore, using either textiles from the 
city's cotton mills or a part of the incessant "dry goodstt arriving 
daily by schooner from the North. Since Northern clothing factories 
also supplied the $4,000,000 balance of the trade, it was an activity 
which, as it increased, further strengthened Baltimore's Northern 
connections. The demand for this clothing is rather unsatisfactorily 
described, by the only source that mentioned distribution of the product 
at all, as 17South, West, and loca1.n20 
Second to dry goods was the trade in flour and grain, with a 
$12,000,000 annual business. Wheat and corn streamed in to the Balti-
' 
more mills from western 1\fu.ryland and the valley of. Virginia, where 
18see Appendix, Tables 12-15, for lists of goods transported to and 
from Baltimore via the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad. 
19Northern Central Railway Company, Sixth Annual Report of the Presi-
dent and Directors to the Stockholders, 1860 (Baltimore: Jas. Lucas & 
Son, 1861), P• 40. 
20uprincipal Trades of Baltimore,u op. cit., pp. 568-569. Clothing 
was not separately itemized in the reports of the railroads, and must 
have been lumped together in the "Miscellaneousn category so dear to 
record-keepers of the day. 
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farmers were enjoying a new prosperity in the combination of an effi-
cient route to market--the B. & 0.--and a large, steady demand--South 
America, the West Indies, Britain, and the Northern states. 21 An 
equal amount of grain moved eastward on the B. & o. all the way from 
the road's Ohio River terminals, showing that the Midwestern producers 
were as important to Baltimore as the Maryland-Virginia group. The 
third large source, perhaps the largest of a11, 22 was in those areas of 
eastern and central Pennsylvania tapped by the Northern Central. 
More than 350,000 of the 966,000 barrels of flour inspected in 
Baltimore during 1860 came from the Ohio River towns, again indicating 
a Midwestern source of supply, while the balance was ground in mills 
nearer the city and whisked downtown on B. & 0. and Northern Central 
freight trains. Now and then a schooner came up from Richmond and 
Petersburg with flour and grain, but this addition to the total was 
insignificant. Strictly minor items in the grain trade were oats and 
rye, most of which came from Pennsylvania, for the horses and distil-
leries, respectively, of Baltimore City. 
Of the 3,000,000-odd bushels of corn received in Baltimore during 
1860, 1,350,000 bushels were shipped coastwise, 470,000 to foreign ports, 
220,000 were ground by city millers, 500,000 by distillers, and 500,000 
bushels were sold for city consumption.23 Without specific evidence one 
2lcraven, op. cit., pp. 129-131. 
22Northern Central Railway, Annual Report, 1860, p. 40. The Nor-
thern Central lists a southward shipment of 16,236 tons of grain in 1860, 
as compared to 15,956 tons arriving in Baltimore via B. & o.--8,813 from· 
the Ohio River and 7,143 from western Maryland and the valley of Virginia. 
The Northern Central does not specify how much of this southbound grain 
actually went clear to Baltimore, and a certain portion of it must have 
been destined for local.mills and markets along the right-of-way. How-
ever, the majority must have gone to the Baltimore milling centers. 
23BBOT, 1860, p. 29. 
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way or the other, it is quite probable that the large shipments of 
coastwise corn had destinations both North and South. The story is 
slightly different in the case of wheat. Half of the 2,850,000 bushels 
received were ground into flour, 600,000 bushels were shipped abroad, 
and a slightly lesser amount was shipped coastwise.24 Again, there is 
no breakdown of the coastwise shipment, but the Northern demand for 
wheat, either as an export commodity or for consumption, was far greater 
than that of the South, and it is extremely likely that the bulk of 
Baltimore's coastwise wheat cargoes was destined for Northern ports. 25 
Nearly 400,000 barrels of flour were shipped abroad, and an 
equal amount was consumed locally; of the 120,000 barrels sent coast-
wise, by far the greater part must have gone to the Northern manufact-
uring centers, or to New York for export. The producing end of 
Baltimore's grain and flour trade, then, lay chiefly in the West and 
North, and in the South only insofar as the Shenandoah Valley and 
western Maryland were Southern areas. The consumers lived in Rio, 
Havana, Halifax, Sheffield, Porto Rico--and also, undoubtedly, in 
Lynn, Haverhill, Fall River, Trenton, and Newark. The South was by 
no means excluded from this trade, but the North and West were the 
key areas. 
24Ibid., p. 28. 
25chesapeake & Delaware Canal Company, Forty-first General Report 
of the President and Directors, 1860 (Philadelphia: Alexander, 1860), 
pp. 12-13. A total of 131,807 barrels of flour and 792,000 bushels of 
wheat moved eastward (toward Philadelphia) on this canal during 1860, 
against a negligible shipment in the opposite direction. Not all of 
this wheat and flour was from Baltimore, of course, but the figures 
help to show that the Northern demand was heavy. See also the reports 
of arrivals in the New York Times, 1860, passim. Ninety per cent of 
the sailing vessels arriving in New York from Baltimore were laden 
with coal; wheat, flour, and lumber followed in that order. 
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Almost without exception, the beef, pork, ham, bacon, butter, and 
lard that made up Baltimore's ~P7 ,000,000 provisions trade came from 
the West, in the freight cars of the Baltimore & Ohio and the Pennsyl-
vania-Northern Central. Baltimore's own packing houses put up nearly 
$1,000,000 worth of provisions in 1860, and one-third of the B. & 0. 
shipments came from western Maryland and northern Virginia, but the 
West raised and slaughtered and packed most of the nation's meat; Gin-
cinnati was still Porkopolis, and Chicago was on her way. In addition 
to a booming export trade in provisions--to the West Indies and South 
America, as usual--and a good local demand, Southern seaboard states 
kept the packing houses and coasting schooners pusy, 26 while other 
quantities of provisions were probably shipped to New England for 
consumption and to New York for export. 27 Closely allied to the pro-
visions trade was the $4,000,000 livestock trade, again involving the 
West, the B. & 0., and the Northern Central. A growing share of this 
livestock moved straight through from the West to New York and Phila-
delphia, via the Philadelphia, Wilmington & Baltimore line; 28 the rest 
provided business not only for the packing houses but also for the 
tanneries. Hides from Buenos Aires and Montevideo as well as from 
Ohio and Indiana were utilized by the Baltimore tanners, whose product 
competed with that of "numerous country tanners South and West, who 
26scharf, op. cit., P• 382. 
27There are two bases for these conjectures. One is the almost 
complete absence of packing houses in New England, coupled with the 
heavy coasting trade between Baltimore and Boston which was almost 
bound to involve provisions as one cargo on the northward leg of the 
voyage. As for New York--her merchants were everywhere, and most of 
the products of the entire Atlantic coast were drawn to the East River 
for export. See Albion, op. cit., pp. 122 ff., et passim. 
28Philadelphia, lvilmington & Baltimore R.R., Annual Report. 1860, 
p. 16. 
33 
send their leather to this market for sale.n29 
And the big buyers, as might be expected, were the Northern boot 
and shoe manufacturers, who got into the market coming and going. 
They bought the leather made by the Baltimore manufacturers and the 
"numerous country tanners South and West," shipped it coastwise or by 
rail to Philadelphia and New York and above all to New England, kept 
their factories whirring, and funneled schooners full of boots and shoes 
into Baltimore as fast as they could be sold and distributed.30 Balti-
more's own boot and shoe establishments had an annual output worth 
over $900,000, but the Northern product dominated the market. The 
Baltimore Board of Trade grumbled a little about the higher prices 
resulting from leather which became a boot or shoe via a New England 
factory when the whole process could have been perfor.med more cheaply 
by local bootmakers,31 but the simple fact was that there were not 
enough factories in Baltimore to meet the demand. Here was another 
major tie with the North. 
The city's annual molasses and sugar trade was estimated at 
$8,000,000. The big Baltimore refineries received the raw product 
not only from the West Indies and Demerara, but from Louisiana and 
Manila and Brazil via New York and the New England ports. Direct for-
eign imports accounted for three-fourths of the receipts; Louisiana 
sugar for the Baltimore market sometimes came direct, but more fre-
quently it had been to Portland or Boston first.32 The refined sugar 
29BBOT, 1859, P• 61. 
3lrbid. 
30ibid. 
32Ibid., 1860, pp. 40-41. 
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and syrups went chiefly to the South and West, the local market, and 
into the Pennsylvania territory served by the Northern Central, while 
the Chesapeake & Delaware Canal carried sizeable amounts in both direc-
tions.33 The sugar connection seems to have involved North, South, 
and '\!Jest more or less indiscriminately, although in a larger sense the 
West, which furnished most of the flour and provisions on which the 
sugar trade depended, was the most important section. 
The tobacco trade, with an annual business of some $7,500,000, 
touched Baltimore in several ways. One major item was the heavy ship-
ment of leaf tobacco to Holland, Bremen, France, England, and Spain--
Baltimore's most lucrative direct export to Europe. Bay craft, wagons, 
and freight cars brought ¥~ryland leaf into the city from every corner 
of the state where tobacco could be grown, the receipts from this 
source constituting two-thirds of the total. All but a fractiamoof 
the rest was classified as Ohio leaf, and Kentucky and Virginia sup-
plied the balance; the Ohio and Kentucky product further swelled the 
list of important commodities that rolled eastward over the "Main Stemn 
of the Baltimore & Ohio. Slightly more valuable than the export of 
leaf was the trade in manufactured tobacco--plugs for the backwoodsman, 
snuff for the dandy, cigars for the merchant, and a pipeful for just 
about anybody. Baltimore's 127 cigar-makers competed with "segars" 
from Havana, and there was a market for both; large quantities of Vir-
ginia manufactures did not freeze out a moderate import of European 
33Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, Thirty-fourth A~ual Report of the 
President and Directors, 1860 (Baltimore: Kelly, Hedian & Piet, 1860), 
PP• 99-101; Northern Central Railway, Annual Report, 1860, p. 40; 
Chesapeake & Delaware Canal Company, Annual Report, 1860, pp. 12-13. 
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brands. And these tobacco products--whatever Baltimoreans did not buy--
went to Porto Rico and the West Indies by brig and schooner, to Phila-
delphia by canal boat, and across the Alleghenies behind a hard-working 
B. & 0. freight engine.34 
This trade was a complex affair, and one of the interesting side 
angles concerns the farmer--any farmer--in Southern Ohio who raised a 
little tobacco. Perhaps he sent a hogshead or two of leaf down to 
the river, whence it moved by steamboat to the B. & 0. warehouse at 
Parkersburg, Virginia, thence by freight car across the mountains to 
Baltimore, under the eyes of the inspector, and eventually into the 
hold of a square-rigger waiting to clear for Bremen. Once across the 
Atlantic, this same leaf might have moved in another steamboat up the 
Weser or the Maas or the Rhine, passed through a factory, recrossed 
the ocean to New York or Boston, thence by schooner to Baltimore, by 
rail to Parkersburg, down the Ohio, and into a pouch from which this 
same farmer, a year or so later, might be lighting his pipe. 
Among the miscellaneous food products, perhaps the least com-
plicated of the city's important trades was that of coffee. Valued 
at $4,000,000, it came almost exclusively from Brazil and went almost 
exclusively to the West, with the North taking most of the balance.35 
34BBOT, 1860, p. 51; Chesapeake & Delaware Canal Company, Annual 
Report, 1860, P• 13; Baltimore & Ohio R. R., Annual Report, 1860, 
PP• 99-101. 
35Baltimore & Ohio R. R., Annual Regort, 1860, pp. 99-101; Nor-
thern Central Railway, Annual Report, 18 O, P• 40. Out of the 15,000-
odd tons of coffee imported, 12,700 tons went westward on the B. & 0., 
and 1,300 more went into Pennsylvania on the Northern Central. Coffee 
was second in importance only to dry goods as westbound freight on the 
Baltimore & Ohio. 
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Nearly eighty per cent of the $4,500,000 oyster trade also had a Western 
market.36 The oysters were either preserved or packed raw, in ice, and 
sent to St. Louis, the chief distributing point, although there was 
also some demand for this Chesapeake Bay product in San Francisco, Aust-
ralia, Europe, and South America.37 The modest trade in salted fish, 
less than one-tenth as valuable as the oyster trade, depended on the 
Maritime Provinces and New England, and also found its chief market in 
the West. The last major food product was the $1,500,000 foreign fruit 
business, which linked the Mediterranean and the Caribbean to Cincinnati 
and Louisville and Charleston and other points "South and West.n38 
According to the Board of Trade, a large proportion of Baltimore's 
hardware business involved foreign manufactures.39 This may have been 
true, but whether the hardware was turned out in Birmingham and Shef-
field or in New England, nearly all of it came to Baltimore from North-
ern ports; out of a trade valued at ~~4,000,000 annually, less than 
$100,000 worth of niron manufactures" was imported directly from Europe 
in 1860, while "hardware" is mentioned constantly among the cargoes 
arriving from New York, Boston, Providence, and smaller New England 
towns. 40 The large markets were again South and West, with the South-
ern portion increasing steadily.41 
36"Principal Trades of Baltimore,n op. cit., p. 56?. 
37BBOT, 1860, P• 48. 
39Ibid., P• 61. 
38Ibid., P• 28. 
4°compiled from ~' Vo~s. for 1860, and shipping lists in the 
Baltimore Price-Current, 1860, passim. 
41BBOT, 1860, P• 51. 
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By far the largest bulk commodity handled in Baltimore, and one 
with a large total value, was coal. This trade, estimated at over 
$3,000,000 in 1860, had two main sources--the big bituminous fields 
of Cumberland and western Virginia, tapped by the Baltimore & Ohio, 
and the anthracite regions of east-central Permsylvania, accessible by 
the Northern Central Railway and the Susqueharma & Tide Water Canal. 
More than 700,000 tons of the two types of coal came into the city 
during 1860 on these three routes, 42 and whatever the industries, en-
gines, and furnaces of Baltimore did not want was readily swallowed up 
by the North--the George's Creek Coal and Iron Company alone sent 185 
coal-laden schooners to New York, Boston, and Providence during the 
year.L0 The bituminous trade was evidently hurt by the high freight 
rates on the Baltimore & Ohio, by the lOW;lprices of anthracite, and 
by competition from the great Philadelphia market and from Nova Scotian 
coal,44 but the increase in city consumption, the good connections 
with Pennsylvania anthracite, and the size of the Northern demand kept 
the total trade in a flourishing condition. 
As previously indicated, Baltimore in 1860 controlled the bulk 
of the guano trade. 45 The demand was almost entirely Southern, 46 and 
42Baltimore & Ohio R. R., Annual Report, 1860, pp. 99-101; North-
ern Central Railway, Annual Report, 1860, P• 40; Livingood, OE· cit., 
P• 80. The B. & 0. carried 400,000 tons of bituminous into Baltimore; 
the Northern Central and the S. & T-W. Canal brought the anthracite 
(300,000 tons) in equal portions. 
43compiled from RRRB, Vols. for 1860. 
44BBOT, 1860, p. 23; "Principal Trades of Baltimore,n OE· cit., 
PP• 570-571. 
45see above, PP• 5-6. 46Rutter, op. cit., p. 43· 
the biggest users were farmers from Virginia and Maryland, where the 
influence of guano upon the recent agricultural revival in these states 
was tremendous.47 The North's connection in this trade was limited to 
a few coastwise shipments from New York and Philadelphia as a minor sup-
plement to Baltimore's heavy receipts from Peru. 
Baltimore added to her heavy importation of Chilean and Cuban 
copper ore by receiving shipments of domestic ore from the mines in 
western Maryland and Tennessee, via the B. & 0., and from mines in the 
Southern seaboard states, via coaster.48 The entire demand for refined 
and ingot copper from the Baltimore smelting companies was obviously 
from the North, since all of the copper rolling mills, sheeting mills, 
and bolt factories were located in New England, New Jersey, and Penn-
sylvania; the Chesapeake & Delaware Canal alone carried over 6,000,000 
pounds of copper to Philadelphia in 186o.49 
The lumber that went into Baltimore's buildings, and into the ships, 
carriages, furniture, pianos, barrels, and other wood products manufac-
tured in the city, came largely via canal and railroad from the forest-
50 rich Susquehanna Valley. Lesser amounts came from the West in B. & 0. 
flat cars and from Georgia pine regions in Savannah and Charleston 
47craven, op. cit., pp. 148-150. 
48Baltimore & Ohio R. R., Annual Report, 1860, p. 106; RRRB, Vols. 
for 1860. The B. & 0. brought 7,849 tons of "iron and copper ore" to 
the city in 1860, while copper ore ranked behind cotton, rice, and lum-
ber as a cargo of the schooners from Charleston and Savannah. 
49chesapeake & Delaware Canal, Annual Report, 1860, p. 12. 
5°susquehanna & Tide-Water Canal, Annual Report, 1860, quoted in 
Livingood, op. cit., P• 75; Northern Central Railway, Annual Report, 
1860, p. 40. The canal sent over 110,000,000 square feet of lumber 
southward in 1860, most of it to Baltimore, and 35,000 tons of lumber 
moved southward on the Northern Central. The principal Susquehanna 
product was v.rhi te pine. 
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schooners. Naval stores, of course, came from the Tarheel State, and 
increasing amounts of miscellaneous wood products such as boards, 
planks, staves, scantling, etc., were being imported from Maine and 
the I1ari time Provinces. 
The city's ~p2,000,000 iron trade involved both pig iron produced 
in the Baltimore area and goodly quantities received via Northern Cent-
ral from Pennsylvania furnaces. Much of this pig iron was used in 
local manufactures, and 10,000 tons were shipped westward on the Balti-
more & Ohio. Earthenware, china, queensware, glassware, and similar 
merchandise coming to the city from Europe and the North found a mar-
ket ''West and South. n51 The North supplied Baltimore with nearly all 
of the books and papers--a trade valued at $3,000,000--the hats and 
caps, drugs, paints, varnish, plaster and other products which the city 
used or sold to its Southern and Western customers. Foreign wines for 
planters' tables crune to Baltimore largely from New York; whiskey for 
Southern tables came largely from the West; the tea marketed in Balti-
more came from China in the great clippers, but up the Chesapeake only 
in humdrum schooners from New York and Boston. 
4• Summary 
The primary elements in Baltimore's economic set-up, as more and 
more of her major lines of trade are revealed, become increasingly clear. 
Like all great commercial centers, the city extended its interests into 
many areas and passed a great variety of products through its factories 
5lnPrincipal Trades of Baltimore," op. cit., P• 574. 
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and warehouses; there was nothing simple about the activities of the 
Baltimore business community in 1860. It is true, for instance, that 
the city's volume of trade with the South was extensive: Southern 
cotton, Southern lumber and naval stores, Southern rice and tobacco 
and farm produce, poured in to the Baltimore market in return for goods 
which Baltimore made available to the South--provisions, boots and 
shoes, textiles ru1d clothing, hardware, sugar, meal, molasses, wines, 
whiskey, and a host of other items. Through the coasting schooners 
that moved into every navigable arm of Chesapeake Bay, connecting with 
the Southern railheads, and down the Atlantic coast into Albemarle 
Sound, Charleston, Savannah, Florida, and the Gulf; and through the 
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad with its Mississippi Valley connection, Bal-
timore enjoyed a heavy and profitable commerce with every corner of 
the Southland. Any interruption or breaking up of this commerce would 
have ruined many merchants and greatly weakened the city's entire eco-
nomic structure--and Baltimore merchants knew it. 
But Baltimore also looked westward. The West, with a more diver-
sified economy, a greater population, and a much faster rate of growth, 
was equal to the South as an actual market and far greater as a paten-
tial one. Westerners drank nearly all of the coffee, ate most of the 
oysters and salt fish, wore as many boots and made as many clothes and 
consumed as much sugar and used as much hardware. The West's greatest 
value was as a source of supply. Without Western wheat and flour ~~d 
beef and pork, Baltimore's entire trade with Latin America would have 
collapsed; without Western leaf tobacco, the major trade with Europe 
would have been considerably diminished. The Baltimore & Ohio and the 
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Pennsylvania-Northern Central were superior to the Mississippi as a 
means of reaching Cincinnati and St. Louis; already, though the '50's 
had been the boom decade on the Western rivers, the railroad was over-
shadowing the steamboat. A loss of the Western market and products 
would undoubtedly have been more damaging to Baltimore's economy than 
the loss of the South. 
In the final analysis, the North was the most important section of 
all. If there was a dominant theme running through the outline of 
Baltimore's principal commercial activities, it concerned the city's 
dependence upon Northern ships and Northern factories for the products 
involved in the Southern and Western trades. A brief run-down of the 
major items--dry goods, clothing, boots and shoes, hardware, earthen-
ware, hats and caps, books, drugs, paint--reveals that Baltimore 
neither imported from abroad nor manufactured enough to meet the de-
mand, and whether the importers and jobbers wanted these products from 
Europe or from New England, New York, and Pennsylvania, they generally 
had to procure them from the Northern market. The North also fur-
nished all of the anthracite and most of the lumber, and consumed much 
of the bituminous coal, nearly all of the copper, and a sizeable quan-
tity of wheat and flour. There was certainly no mistaking the combined 
importance of the West and North. The twin props on which Baltimore's 
prosperity depended, and without which the house would have fallen, were 
the iron rails of the Baltimore & Ohio and the steamships and coasting 
schooners from Sandy Hook and Boston Harbor. 
Dependent on all the major sections, the Baltimore merchants could 
study the political crisis in 1860 from the economic standpoint and be 
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convinced that preservation of the Union--in its entirety--was all-
important. What might happen if the Union dissolved, in spite of the 
best efforts at compromise, was something else again. Baltimore had 
numerous political, social, and cultural ties with the South, including 
the powerful common·bond of slavery; more significant from the business 
point of view was the damage inherent in the loss of the Southern market. 
Yet if Baltimore and the state of Maryland chose to secede, the loss of 
the Western and Northern commercial ties would be more than damaging. 
It would be suicidal--and in their ledgers and account books, if not 
in their hearts, the Baltimore merchants knew this, too. 
CHAPTER III 
BEFORE SUMTER 
l. The Election of 1860 
The people of Mar,yland, along with those of the other border slave-
states, approached the election of 1860 with a good deal of excitement, 
not unmixed with apprehension. There were four candidates, four parties, 
four platforms, and an excessive amount of speech-making on many topics, 
but the real issue of the campaign was slavery, and with it the question, 
no longer academic, of whether the nation cuuld endure half slave and 
half free. Abraham Lincoln had once remarked that he did not think it 
could. Many Southerners, foreseeing Lincoln's triumph at the head of a 
sectional, anti-slavery party, did not think so either, and most of the 
leading politicians of the Gulf states had already announced that the 
election of Lincoln would mean the disruption of the Union.1 As a slave 
state, Maryland had the same grievances as the states farther South, 
and was definitely opposed to the election of a Republican president. 
On the other hand, socially and geographically much less Southern, and 
with far less of a stake in the institution of slavery,2 Marylanders 
could not get too enthusiastic about the idea of a broken Union; talk of 
secession was almost as alarming as the speeches of the abolitionists. 
lDwight 1. Dumond, The Secession Movement, 1860-1861 (New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1931) , p. 99. ·' · 
2charies B. Clark, ttPolitics in Maryland during the CiVil War,n 
Maryland Historical Magazine, XXXVI (September, 1941), pp.248-252. The 
number of slaves in Maryland had been decreasing since 1790, while the 
number of free Negroes, negligible in 1790, was by 1860 almost equal to 
the slave .population. 
43 
44 
For the Baltimore business men the problem was especially difficult. 
The diversity and complexity of their economic interests has already 
been noted. They had gratefully seen and recorded the business upswing 
of 1860,3 only to be faced with threats of a post-election panic and de-
pression; the possible secession of the cotton states, with an attendant 
disruption of established trade patterns, was more alarming still. What-
ever their personal differences regarding the political situation, the 
Baltimore mercantile community naturally and unanimously desired to stay 
pro~perous, and they faced the November election with the uneasy knowledge 
that there were uncertain times ahead for prosperity. 
Although John Breckinridge, the candidate of the Southern Democratic 
Party, ultimately carried the state, most of the Baltimore business men 
chose to support John Bell and Edward Everett, the Constitutional Union 
candidates. The commercial interests of Maryland, largely centered in 
Baltimore, had early been supporters of the .whig Party and Henry Clay's 
American System.4 Maryland remained a Whig stronghold during the 1830's 
and 40's, and when the organization died out in the next decade, many 
for.mer Whigs attached themselves or gave temporary support to the Ameri-
can or Know-Nothing Party .5 Even in Maryland, where the movement had 
been strongest, Know-Nothingism was dying out by 1860; for Whigs who had 
3Board of Trade, Annual Report, 1860, p. 5; Corn and Flour Exchange, 
Annual Report, 1860, P• 5. 
4Arthur C. Cole, The Whig Party in the South (Washington: American 
Historical Association; London: Oxford University Press, 1913), pp. 2-4. 
5Ibid., pp.308-310, 315, 320; Laurence F. Schrneckebier, History of 
the Know-Nothing Party in Maryland, Johns Hopkins University Studies in 
Historical and Political Science, Series XVII, Nos. 4-5 (Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins Press, 1899), pp. 66-67. 
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consistently opposed the Democracy, the Constitutional Union Party was 
the next logical stopping-place.6 
The Bell and Everett party contained more than an appeal to late 
Know-Nothings and die-hard Whigs. Its platform was Southern enough to 
satisfy all save the most ardent pro-slavery advocates,? enabling Balti-
more merchants who had small taste for Breckinridge Democracy to vote 
without compromising their Southern sympathies. Most attractive of all, 
however, was Bell's attitude towards the Union, which he favored, and 
towards slavery, which he ignored. This suited the Baltimore capitalist 
perfectly. He usually had friends and accounts in New England and the 
cotton country alike, and the topic of slavery impressed him chiefly as 
an obstacle in the path of smooth, expanding business relations; the less 
said about it, the better. The Constitutional Unionists talked about 
forgetting sectional strife and keeping the Union intact, and this was 
precisely the sort of thing profit-minded Baltimoreans wanted to hear. 
For these reasons, then, the business men turned out to support Bell 
and Everett in large numbers. On Wednesday, October 24, during the last 
frenzied fortnight before election, tta number of influential merchants 
of our city" met to make plans for participating in the forthcoming Union 
demonstration on November l, and Marston & Brothers, dealers in chinaware 
and crockery, donated the hall over their establishment at Baltimore and 
6Schmeckebier, QE• cit., pp.ll4-115; see also Dumond, op. cit., p. 92, 
who maintains that the entire Union Party was composed of "survivors of 
the Whigs with the American element especially prominent.n. 
?Dumond, o~. cit., pp. 93-94; Emerson D. Fite, The Presidential Cam-
paign of 1S60 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1911), pp.242-243. The 
Union platform, while frowning at secession, definitely stressed state 
rights and constitutional protection of minorities. 
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and Hanover streets for future merchants' meetings.8 A group of mer-
chants also chartered the Bay steamer Pioneer for the purpose of attend-
ing a "Grand Union" demonstration at Easton, over on the Eastern Shore,9 
and on October 27 another Bell-Everett group assembled at the Marston 
brothers' hall to discuss the Baltimore Union demonstation.10 
On October 30 and again on November 1 the Bell-Everett supporters 
held large mass meetings, for which the Baltimore business men turned 
out in droves.11 The printed lists included most of the leading bankers, 
manufacturers, commission merchants, flour millers, dry goods and hard-
ware firms, and embraced a large cross-section of every economic activity 
in Baltimore. The November 1 affair included a parade of the Minute Men, 
a volunteer militia outfit dedicated to the support of the Unionist candi-
dates, who marched by torch-light past the illwninated stores of pro-Union 
merchants. The Clipper, enthusiastic Bell-Everett and former Know-Nothing 
organ, announced somewhat over-optimistically that "this large turnout of 
citizens, and the general sympathy manifested in it by all the crowds of 
spectators, is the best evidence the community could desire of the popu-
larity of the cause of the Union, and its certain triumph at the ballot-
box next week." Even the Daily Ex.ch ange, a Breckinridge paper, admitted 
8Baltimore Clipper, October 27, 1860. 
9Ibid., Among the members of the committee in charge of this operation 
were Samuel Hazlehurst, manufacturer and member of the Board of Trade; 
William F. Larrabee, junior partner of a boot and shoe establishment; and 
John T. McPherson, produce commission merchant. 
lOibid., October 29, 1860. William Woodward, Daniel Miller, Charles 
w. Lentz, Charles Grinnell, and E. George Matthews were among the merchants 
who presided at this meeting. 
llclipper, October 31, 1860; Baltimore Daily Exchange, November 2, 1860. 
Enoch Pratt, William McKim, Johns Hopkins, Chauncey Brooks, Archibald Stirling, 
Benjamin Deford, E. A. Abbott, William Chesnut, Adam Denmead, and George W. 
Howard were among the hundreds of leading capitalists serving as officers of 
these meetings. 
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that the turnout was large, the affair colorful, and the crowd enthusi-
astic.12 In any case, a large and imposing body of merchants helped to 
organize the demonstrations, served as officers, and evidently approved 
of the numerous speeches which fixed responsibility for the country's 
troubles on the Republicans and Southern Democrats alike.13 The Clipper 
was completely carried away by the affair, concluding happily that it was 
"in fact an outpouring of the people •••• an expression of the great 
popular heart.nl4 
Mercantile support for the Southern-rights party of Breckinridge and 
Lane was less in evidence. At the last important pre-election meeting of 
the Southern Democrats, only a handful of business names were listed as 
officers.15 Joshua Vansant, prominent hat and fur dealer, was on the 
Breckinridge ticket for Maryland's third Congressional district,l6 which 
included ten Baltimore wards; throughout this period Mr. Vansant remained 
one of the most outspoken champions of Southern rights. Other business 
men, especially those whose names appeared later among the group demand-
ing a state convention and the convening of the state Legislature, were 
undoubtedly Breckinridge Democrats, but the names among the Constitutional 
Union supporters would seem to indicate that a majority of the business 
12clipper, Exchange, November 2, 1860. 
13clipper, November 2, 1860. 
14rbid. 
l5Exchange, October 30, 1860. Charles D. Slingluff, grocer and com-
mission merchant; Thomas Winans, inventor and machinist; Wendell Bollman, 
German-born bridge~builder; William H. Ortwine, of the Howard Fire Insur-
ance Company;. and Charles J. Baker, bank director and manufacturer, were 
among the officers. 
16Baltimore Sun, November 5, 1860. 
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community were loyal to the Union in N0 vember, 1860, or at least to the 
Bell-Everett version of the Union. 
The Douglas Democrats did not amount to much in the Maryland elec-
tion. One paper reported that a Douglas-Johnson meeting in Baltimore on 
November 2 was attended by some two thousand "very enthusiastic" persons,l7 
a number considerably in excess of the forthcoming Douglas vote in the 
city. In addition to such outstanding attorneys as Reverdy Johnson, Jr.,· 
Charles F. Mayer, and Henry May, a Douglas elector, this meeting was of-
ficered by a handful of business men, none of any prominence.l8 Old-line 
Baltimore Democrats obviously found more to their liking in the Breckin-
ridge platform, while those who wanted compromise and an end of sectional 
squabbling preferred the gentle offerings of Bell; there was little room 
left for Douglas. 
Even less significant were the activities of the Maryland Republicans. 
In spite of the earnest labors of Montgomery Blair, who knew how to do 
such things, efforts at organizing a real Republican Party in the state 
met with strong opposition and scant success,19 and half-hearted at-
tempts on the part of the Know-Nothings and RepubJJc ans to cooperate fell 
through completely before election time.20 The only group in.Baltimore 
l7Exchange, November 3, 1860. 
18Among the names listed in the Sun and Exchange of November 3 were 
Robert T. Banks, importer of china.ware, and John W. Williams, planing mill 
and sash factory owner. The other officers iftcluded a potter, a restau-
rant owner, a tavern keeper, a coppersmith, and a Custom-House inspector--
ncapitalists"only in the broadest sense of the term. 
19For a brief account of Blair's Republican endeavors in Maryland, 
see William E. Smith, The Francis Preston Blair Family in Politics (New 
York: The Macmillan Company, 1933), I, 487-489, 500-501. See also Dieter 
Cunz, "'fhe l-1aryland Germans in the Civil War," Maryland Historidal Maga-
~' XXXVI (September, 1941), 407-409. 
20George 1. P. Radcliffe, Governor Thomas H. Hicks of Ma:;xland and 
the Civil War (Baltimore: The Lord, Baltimore Press, 1901), pp. 17-18. 
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with a taste for Republicanism in 1S60 wast the lower and middle class 
German element--48er's and their friends, subscribers to the German-lan-
guage Wecker, Baltimore's sole Republican newspaper. 21 Republican busi-
ness men were hard to find, partly because they were few in numbers and 
also, undoubtedly, because it was not overly healthy to be an avowed Re-
publican in Baltimore at this time. Twice the Republicans attempted 
demonstrations in the city ("the Nigger-worshippers farce of a mass meet-
ing," as the Clipper bluntly put it), and each time a hostile crowd gath-
ered to hiss, jostle, heave rotten egg~, and force the Lincoln supporters 
to seek police protection and abandon their gathering.22 
Nevertheless one or two merchants appeared openly in the Republican 
camp. Francis S. Corkran, a lumber and coal dealer, was a Lincoln elec-
tor for one of the Baltimore districts,23 and Philip Hiss, of the cabinet-
making firm of Hiss and Austen, had been a Republican since the party's 
formation.24 A. J. Randolph, another lumber merchant, had joined theRe-
publicans shortly after the dissolution of the Whig Party.25 James Carey 
Coale, a Baltimore-born Quaker, agent for Lloyd's and other marine under-
writers, member of the Board of Trade, and director in several corportations, 
had been an anti-slavery man and a Republican since 1S56.26 There is no 
2lcunz, ttThe Maryland Germans in the Civil War," op. cit., pp. 400-414. 
For a fuller treatment of the liberal German societies and the Wecker before 
and during the war, see Cunz, The Maryland Germans (Princeton, N. J.! Prince-
ton University Press, 1948), PP• 24S ff., 259-261, 269-283, and esp. Chap. 
VIII, "The Civil War Yea.:i;rs.n 
22clipper, October 30, 1860; November 2, 1860. The Sun and Exchange were 
less outspoken but no less contemptuous of Republican activities in Baltimore. 
232Qrr, November 5, 1860. 
Publishing Co., 1879 , 
25~., pp.622-623. 26Ibid., P• 452. 
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record of Coale ever having been threatened, mobbed, or ostracized for 
his political views--all of which were distinct possibilities in pre-
Civil War Baltimore--and perhaps his fellow business men could dismiss 
as Quaker eccentricity the views of a man who had a good deal to do with 
the setting of marine insurance rates. Republicanism was not destined to 
be out and out heresy in Maryland business circles much longer, but in 
1860 the men of capital, in keeping with the prevailing attitude in the 
city and state, had smallluse for the Northern sectional party. 
It was soon obvious that the only strong parties in Maryland and 
Baltimore were the Constitutional Unionists and the Breckinr!dge Democrats, 
between which groups the rivalry was keen and spirited. In New York state, 
where a Republican victory appeared fairly probable, pro-Southern and pro-
Union merchants in New York City used their influence and wealth to set 
up a fusion ticket among the other three parties, a measure which kept 
the city but not the state from going Republican. 27 In Baltimore there 
was no need to fuse against the Republicans, and evidently small desire 
to combine for any other purpose. The Clipper indignantly maintained 
that only Bell and Everett could solve the country's problems and put an 
end to the sectional dispute; a vote for the other parties was a vote for 
sectionalism and discord. Ignoring the Douglas group, the Clipper in the 
heat of the campaign referred to the other parties as "nigger-worshipping 
John Brownites" on one hand and "ungrateful, unprincipled and demoralized 
27Philip S. Foner, Business and Slavery (Chapel Hill, N. c.: Un~ver­
sity of North Carolina Press, 1941), Chap. VIII. Foner's book is ~t~­
tailed and well-documented account of the political views and acti ~es 
of the New York business community before the Civil War. 
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Yancey-Breckitss" on the other. 28 The Exchange rather sharply reminded 
the Unionists that a vote for Bell merely increased the chances of aRe-
publican victory, and that if the entire South, allied with conservative 
Northerners, united in favor of Breckinridge the Union could be main-
tained and Southern wrongs righted.29 In spite of the essential similar-
ity of the Bell and Breckinridge platforms, each group, in Baltimore and 
elsewhere in the South, approached the election with the strong feeling 
that it alone could save the Union. 
One author has remarked that the election of 1860 was marked through-
out the country by a serious and intelligent interest on the part of the 
people; violence was exceptional, and the record-breaking number of cam-
paign speeches stressed an intellectual and historical approach.30 On 
the whole, the election in Baltimore lived up to this standard. Even in 
a city famous for its low boiling-point there was little evidence of any-
thing more than normal exuberance, plus some egg-throwing at the Republi-
cans. Respectable citizens, recalling the violence and fraud of previous 
Baltimore elections, before and during the period of Know-Nothing rule,31 
doubtless looked forward to voting day with day with a good deal of appre-
hension, but their fears were largely unfounded. The interested crowds 
28clipper, October 26, October 27, November 3, 1860. 
29Exchange, November 5, 1860. 
30Fite, op. cit., pp. ix, xi. There were also noisy demonstrations, 
heckling of stump speakers, and, naturally, bitter and uncompromising at-
titudes, but Fite's point is that campaigning went far beyond mere mud-
slinging, foot~stamping, and emotional appeals. 
3lschmeckebier, op. cit., discusses the election tactics of the Know-
Nothings and their opponents during the 1850's, pointing out that Baltimore 
had had rioting, violence, and "roughs" previous to the advent of the Amer-
ican Pa~ty. See esp. pp. 18-19, 27-28, 36-45, 101-102, 115, et passim. 
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that gathered on Baltimore Street and around the newspaper offices, to 
hear and discuss election news, were much quieter and more peaceably dis-
posed than in previous years, and one paper noted that "all the discus-
sions and conversations were carried on in the best feeling and in a 
moderate tone of voice. The crowds continued throughout the day without 
the least disorder •••• n32 During the actual voting, nas a general 
thing the police had very little to do; there seemedf to be no disposi-
tion on thepart of the voters but to act in an orderly manner. . . . tt33 
The Unionists, with the support of Governor Hicks, Mayor George Wil-
liam Brown,34 and a majority of the city's business men, remained extremely 
confident of success until election day was almost over; the Breckinridge 
forces were correspondingly downhearted.35 These attitudes eventually 
changed as Breckinridge, after trailing his rival in the early returns, 
slowly pulled out in front and finally carried both city and state by a 
small plurality.36 The Exchange again complimented the city of Baltimore 
on the character and outcome of the election, and even the disappointed 
32Exchange, November 5, 1860. 
33rbid., November 7, 1860. Both the Clipper and Exchange reported 
minor fist-fighting among the rowdy elements of the Bell and Breckinrigge 
supporters, but this was obviously to be expected, and had little effect 
on the general atmosphere. 
34Radcliffe, op. cit., p. 19. Although Brown had just been elected 
on a Reform ticket, successfully aimed at sweeping the Know-Nothings out 
of office, he supported Bell in the presidential election in spite of the 
great number of former Know-NOthings in the Bell camp. 
35Exchange, November 7, 1860. 
36stin, November 7, 1860, gave the following figures for Baltimore City: 
Breckinridge, 14,950; Bell, 12,618; Douglas, 1,502; Lincoln, 1,084. The of-
ficial figures for the state were published in the Sun of November 24: 
Breckinridge, 42,482; Bell, 41,760; Douglas, 5,966; Lincoln, 2,294. 
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Clipper grudgingly admitted that order had "generally" prevailed.37 In 
spite of the "Grand Union Demonstrations" and the activities of the busi-
ness men in behalf of Bell and Everett, the Southern Democrats turned out 
to be the largest single group in the city, polling nearly fifty per cent 
of the popular vote. 
The merchants who had voted for Breckinridge, while ;.evidently fewer 
in number than the Bell supporters, undoubtedly constituted a fairly sub-
stantial group. In spite of the Unionist claims to the contrary, pro-
Breckinridge Baltimoreans, capitalists or otherwise, were not necessarily 
the advocates of disunion and secession. The real sentiments of this 
group were probably well expressed by a post-election editorial in the 
Exchange: 
The city of Baltimore has protested against the fanatical spirit 
and the manifold aggressions of the Republican party, and has mani-
fested her cordial sympathy with her wronged and overmatched sisters 
of the South •••• Whatever, therefore, Maryland may do, the South 
may rest assured that Baltimore will unite with her in all lawful 
efforts to check any further agitation of the slavery question, and 
to compel the Republican party to respect the Constitutional guar-
antees which protect the institutions of the slave States. 
And then the important modifier: 
We say that Baltimore vtlll unite in all lawful efforts to secure 
these ends, and it is but frank to say that in our judgment, she 
will only be the ally of the South, so long as the latter seeks to 
right herself through the laws under the Constitution. Though we 
in common with the South have just reason to feel aggrieved at the 
treatment we have received from the North, we do unhesitatingly 
assert that we have not yet been driven to the point at which revo-
lution alone can remedy the wrongsaf a people. We do aver, there-
fore, that.Baltimore has not by her vote of yesterday sanctioned any 
37Exchange, Clipper, November 7, 1860. The Clipper, with a slightly 
sour-grapes attitude, qualified its approval of the peaceful elections by 
describing an attack on Union headquarters by a gang of Breckinridge fol-
lowers, and went on to claim that the police, in quelling what disorder 
there was,were invariably sympathetic to the''Breck-ites.n 
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disunion scheme or sentiment whatsQeYer, and it is our earnest 
hope that she may never feel herself impelled to seek for justice 
through secession •••• At all events, we would trust to the guid-
ance of worse men than Mr. Lincoln, rather than sanction at this 
juncture any step that would imperil the bonds of the Union, or 
shake the stability of the Republic.38 
Later editorials continued in this vein. The South was cautioned that 
Maryland's vote for tte Southern candidate was not an endorsement of that 
section's "mad heresies and passionate bitterness"; there wass still time 
and hope for compromise and conciliation, toward which all the states 
should strive. Maryland, as an "exposed and frontier slave-holding State," 
was just as concerned with Constitutional protection of slavery as were 
the Gulf states, but had "a heavier stake, proportionately, in the pres-
ervation of the Union, so far as her material prosperity is concerned, 
than any of her sister commonwealths.n_ True, the South had been wronged, 
and it was up to the North to make redress, but again the warning fol-
lowed that'~he people of Baltimore are not prepared to follow the lead 
of those who recklessly choose to enter upon a path which must bring them 
face to face with evils worse than any we have yet endured.n39 Real 
secession sentiment in Baltimore, if it existed, had not yet come out into 
the open, and was certainly not apt to be present among even the pro-
Southern merchants at this time. 
Nor were the Bell and Everett business men by any means "uncondi-
tional Unionists" in N0 vember, 1860. The Clipper denounced "black repub-
licanism" (there were seldom any mere Republicans in the Baltimore press 
38Exchange, November 7, 1860. The author's italics. 
39Ibid., November 8, November 12, 1860. 
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during this period; they were nearly all black) with fervor enough to 
satisfy William L. Yancey himself, and the Bell speeches in behalf of 
preserving the Union were all predicated on the assumption that Southern 
rights would be secured. Despite fist-fights and editorial sniping between 
Unionists and Southern Democrats during the campaign, the two parties in 
Baltimore were united on the common grounds of distrusting Republicans 
and the North generally, sympathizing with the states farther South, and 
seeking some means of settling the slavery question--in favor of the South 
--without disrupting the Union. Many merchants who voted for Bell in 1860 
would swing to a more Southern point of view when secession became a fact 
along the Gulf, with chances of compromise correspondingly dimmer. The 
only real difference between the Bell and Breckinridge business men at 
this time lay in their ideasfor solving the sectional dispute--the former 
by uniting the conservatives of both sections against the extremists, and 
the latter by uniting all the slave states into a group strong enough to 
force a compromise out of the North. Few capitalists had supported Doug-
las or Lincoln, and the real breach between the two principal groups was 
yet to come. 
2. Business Depression 
However much the Baltimore business community had hoped for compro-
mise after the election, it soon became apparent that things were going 
to get a lot worse before they got better. Nervousness about the elec-
tion results had brought on a slow recession in business conditions all 
over the country, starting as early as midsummer. From November on the 
gradual downward curve sharpened considerably. Two Baltimore banking houses 
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suspended the week before the election,4° and on N0 vember 21 the rest of 
the city's bank officers met and decided on a general suspension of specie 
payments, which took place on the following morning.41 Although this re-
sulted in a temporary relieving of "the existing money pressure," and "a 
very much improved feeling in commercial and financial circles, n42 the 
optimists who predicted a trade revival were largely whistling in the 
dark. Coffee, sold chiefly to the West, was "in good demand and quite 
firm, but it is almost the only article of merchandise in which there is 
any degree of animation or vitality.n43 The banking house of Samuel Harris 
& Sons failed on November 23, with liabilities estimated at $200,000.44 
The falling off in arrivals and clearances at the port,45 after a heavy 
spring and summer trade, was abnormal even for the customarily slack early 
winter season. 
The one or two bright spots in the trading picture only reflected the 
political crisis. The action of the Dadeville, Alabama, house of Page & 
Fleishl was probably duplicated by several Southern firms; writing to a 
Baltimore hardware firm in late NOvember, Page & Fleishl placed a small 
40Clipper, November 1, 1860. The houses suspendipg were Josiah Lee 
& Co. and Appleton & Co. 
41Exchange, November 22, 1860. The Philadelphia banks followed suit, 
and the New York banks were expected to do likewise. For the action of 
the New York banks, see Foner, op. cit., pp.211-215. 
42Exchange, November 22, 1860. 43Ibid., November 20, 1860. 
44clipper, November 24, 1860. 
45Merchants Exchange Reading Room Recora Books showed a decrease 
from ten or fifteen arrivals per day in early summer to an average of 
three or four per day in December--a far more noticeable falling off tban 
in 1859. 
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order for chains and hoes, then added: 11We have concluded to change our 
trade from New York to some point in the South owing to the great politi-
cal excitement now existing in our section of the country. One of our 
firm will visit Baltimore in the Spring to buy a Stock of Goods . . . n46 
A few Baltimore merchants also benefited, no doubt uneasily, from another 
marked development--the sudden Southern demand for firearms. Magruder, 
Taylor & Roberts received dozens of letters from Southern customers dur-
ing the fall and winter, ordering everything from pikes and muskets to 
shot and shell,47 and a newspaper noted that "those of our merchants who 
are engaged in the sale of fire-arms have their hands full of orders. 
Not a mai:l arrives from the South but comes charged with orders from all 
sections of that country for guns and pistols. • • .n4S A momentary rush 
of good business for a handful of firms was small consolation alongside 
the obvious trend in Southern sentiment; compromise and peace hardly lay 
in this direction. 
other indications of what the deep South had in mind were not lack-
ing. During November and December the legislatures of six states passed 
bills providing for state conventions,49 obviously to consider the ques-
tion of secession. Agents of Baltimore firms, in their customary pil-
grimage through the South to collect bills for last year's trade and to 
46Page & Fleishl to Magruder, November 28, 1860, Magruder, Taylor & 
Roberts papers, Maryland Historical Society, Baltimore, Md. 
47rbid., November, 1860-February, 1861, ~~sim. 
48Exchange, November 22, 1860. Five firms (Merrill, Thomas & Co., 
Poultney & Trimble, F. B. Loney & Co., William Harris, and A. McComas) 
were mentioned as doing a particularly heavy business. 
49south Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Mississippi, Texas, and Louisi-
ana.. Alabama had passed a convention bill as early as February 24, 1860. 
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place orders for the next, reported not only unhappy business conditions 
but an unmistakable and generally hostile attitude in the cotton country. 
The experiences of the hardware firm of Magruder, Taylor, & Roberts were 
typical. Roberts wrote from Georgia in mid-November: 
This country is in a great state of excitement and nearly every 
man.I have seen is for secession. There is a general stagnation of 
business and little or no money in the country. I have met several 
men on their way home who could do nothing in the way of collections 
You can for.mno idea of the condition of things out here. If a 
man dared to declare himself for the Union in this neighbourhood 
he would be regarded as a traitor to the South and an ally of the 
Black Republicans.50 
Still in Georgia three weeks later, the junior partner moaned that "times 
look awful blue. Business is almost entirely suspended. Nearly every 
man is for secession and a fight. I fear nothing can be done in the way 
of orders this winter • . . n5l Other letters continued in this vein. 
Business conditions and chances for reconciliation seemed to be going 
downhill together. 
J. The Legislature Question 
In the midst of their troubles, and as a possible means of allevi-
ating them, Baltimore business men considered the course of their own 
state. The first question, which arose immediately after the election 
of Lincoln, was whether or not the Maryland Legislature should be con-
vened in special session. Governor Hicks studied the matter, read the 
petitions and letters urging him to convene, and others urging him not 
50John B. Roberts to Magruder, November 21, 1860, Magruder, Taylor 
& Roberts papers. 
5laoberts to Magruder, December 10, 1860, ibid. 
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to, and decided against a special session during thefall and winter of 
1860-1861.52 Those merchants who agreed with Hicks and felt that the 
Legislature had no business assembling might be called more solid Union-
ists than those who had merely voted for Bell; even with the outright 
secession of their "brethern of the South" staring them in the face they 
chose to sit it out, still hoping for compromise but unwilling to align 
themselves with the Gulf states. "It is not worth while," as one edi-
torial put it, "for us of the border States to give more importance than 
necessary to the madness of the Southern disunion agitators. 
ter to wait and see ifthe disease will not exhaust itself •• 
It is bet-
n53 . . 
Even in January, with South Carolina already out of the Union and se-
cession conventions about to assemble in three other states, another news-
paper felt that nhad Governor Hicks given way to the pressure brought 
against him, tha. t fact would have been claimed as placing Maryland among 
the seceded States •••• n Excitement would have been created, modera-
tion lost, and public sentiment "manufactured ••• in favor of extreme 
action •• n54 . 
It is harder to define the feelings of those in favor of an extra 
session. Outright secessionists, still a small minority, made up one 
fringe of this group. Many simply felt that Maryland should go on record 
52see Radcliffe, op. cit., pp. 21-35, for the pros and cons of this 
question, and Hicks's reasons for not convening the Legislature. The Gov-
ernor was already pursuing his course of keeping Maryland quiet, and hence 
in the Union, while the cotton states passed their ordinances of secession. 
53clipper, November 26, 1860. The Clipper here enumerated several 
reasons (also put forth by Governor Hicks) why a special session was 
unnecessary, and generally ridiculed the idea. 
54Baltimore American, January 2, 1861. 
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as sympathetic to the cotton states, and some undoubtedly hoped that the 
state, speaking through her Legislature, could mediate between the two 
sections. They all felt that some sort of action in the emergency was 
called for, and that the present course was merely one of aimless drift-
ing. The Exchange advanced the moderate view: "If Maryland would not be 
an object of contempt among her sister States, whether of the North or the 
South, it is incumbent upon her, soon, to take her own position, whatever 
may be the one which she desires to occupy. She cannot shape the issues 
of the times by dodging them, and the day for 'masterly inactivity' has 
gone by. n55 . And the Sun, discussing the need for united action on 
the part of the Southern states, sounded a more threatening note: "The 
people of the North ••• do not, perhaps, realize the fact that with the 
secession of the lower tier of States, that of all the rest ~ the slave 
States is inevitable •••• If disunion proves inevitable, the line will 
be drawn North of Maryland • • . u56 
Around the middle of December the business men in favor of a special 
session circulated a petition through the city, hoping to persuade the 
Governor to take the desired action.57 The circular, signed by some 250 
names, mostly business firms,appeared in the daily papers on December 22, 
calling for a meeting that evening to discusss the importance of conven-
ing the Legislature.58 The assemblage listened to speeches praising 
55Exchange, November 23, 1860. Later editorials in the Exchange 
(November 29, December 12, December 27) had a slightly stronger tone, 
still recommending a special session. 
56sun, November 27, 1860. On December 8 the Sun again stressed the 
imperative need for action on thepart of Maryland. 
57 Exchange, December 17, 1860. 
58 Exchange, Clipper, Sun, December 22, 1860 • 
. - --·' 
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Southern patience, condemning Northern fanaticism, and stressing the 
need for action on Maryland's part in order to save the Union; it was 
then resolved to send a committee to Governor Hicks demanding that he 
convene the Legislature.59 
Editorial opinion regarding this meeting was naturally varied. A 
Union paper termed it"evident that a large preponderance of those in at-
tendance were of the league known as Breckinridge Democracy--the Union 
men and Douglas Democracy generally believing that more can be accomplished 
by remaining in the Union, and demanding our rights under • • • the Con-
stitution. .u60 The Southern press noted that the meeting"was com-
posed, for the most part, of the best class of our citizens," admitted 
that 11very decided evidences of dissent from the line of policy pursued 
by South Carolina were made manifest," but called attention to the "over-
whelming and energetic demonstrations" against coercing a seceded state 
by the use of Federal troops.61 Meanwhile Hicks received the committee 
and again refused to take any action. 62 This was the only attempt made 
directly by Baltimore merchants to secure a session of the Legislature. 
General approval of the Governor's policy in business circles was 
far more widespread.. Archibald Stirling, Sr., president of the Savings 
Bank of Baltimore, wrote to Hicks opposing a session of the Legislature,63 
59Exchange, Clipper, December 24, 1860. 60clipper, December 24, 1860. 
61Exchange, December 24, 1860. 
62clipper, December 27, 1860; see also Radcliffe, op. cit., p. 29. 
63stirling to Hicks, December 17, 1860, Thomas H. Hicks papers, 
Jlf.IB.ryland Historical Society, Baltimore, Md. 
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and on December 28 Stirling presided over a Union meeting at the Law 
JBU.ilding, composed, as even the Southern press admitted, nof the most 
respectable class of citizens, irrespective of party.u64 Among the busi-
ness men present was Henry M. Warfield, prominent miller and president of 
the Corn and Flour Exchange, who had recently attended the pro-Legisla-
ture gathering on December 22. Warfield now spoke in favor of the Union, 
Although he and Charles W. Lentz, wealthy German merchant, objected to 
a proposed resolution endorsing Hicks' policy.65 The resolution was duly 
passed, however, 66 along with another resolution calling for a Union mass 
meeting some time in January. The group adjourned after applauding 
speeches in favor of the Union and opposed to secession, yet desiring the 
maintenance of Southern rights--altogether a rather typical Baltimore 
viewpoint at this time. 
At the end of the year some thirteen hundred citizens, predominantly 
business men, signed a memorial approving the Governor's action in refus-
ing to summon the Legislature.67 Hicks received a much larger memorial 
in January, signed by over five thousand Baltimoreans, again endorsing 
his policy. Although this list of signers was not published in the papers, 
it was claimed that the supporters included nnine-tenths of the business 
men of the city.n68 It is probably safe to assume that a good majority, 
64Exchange, December 28, 1860. 
65sun, December 28, 1860. 66Ibid. 
67washington National Intelligencer, January l, 1861, quoted in Carl 
M. Frasure, "Union Sentiment in Maryland, 1859-1861,11 Maryland Historical 
Magazine, XXIV (September, 1929), pp. 214-215. 
68American, January l, 1861. The pro-Union American was doubtless 
guilty of exaggeration in arraying nine-tenths of the business men behind 
Hicks, but even allowing for partisan zeal, support of the Governor by the 
business community must have been impressive. 
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but by no means all, of the Baltimore business men agreed with Hicks that 
a special session of the Maryland Legislature was unnecessary, thus plac-
ing themselves solidly on the side of the Union at the end of 1860. 
4. The Convention Question 
Between January 3 and February 1, 1861, conventions in }fississippi, 
Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, and Texas met and passed ordinances 
of secession. Attempts at compromise in Congress had failed. It looked 
more and more as though Maryland and the other border slave states would 
have to abandon their hopes for an unbroken Union and choose between a 
Northern and a Southern confederacy. Perh~ps even yet the border states, 
by acting carefully,could constitute a balance of power and promote some 
sort of reconciliation. In any event, it was argued by many, they would 
have to do something. When faced by a crisis that included the possibil-
ity of civil war, piously looking the other way seemed not only futile 
but dangerous • 
Armed with these and other arguments, Marylanders who wanted their 
state to speak and act began to think about a convention. One of the 
reasons for desiring a session of the Legislature had been the hope that 
this body would pass a bill authorizing a convention. The Governor stead-
fastly refused to convene the Legislature; very well, said his opponents, 
perhaps we can engineer a convention in some other way. On December 28, 
even while the Union meeting was progressing at the Law Building, some 
other "leading merchants, jurists, and business men of Baltimore" gathered 
at Barnum's Hotel for a ttCrisis Meeting.n69 Reporters were not admitted 
69~, Exchange, December 28, 1860. Thomas Winans and George w. Dobbin 
were among the business men in charge of the meeting; Severn Teackle Wallis 
and William H. Norris, strongly pro-southern, were two of the "leading 
jurists." 
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to this gathering, and left Barnum's with the sole knowledge that the 
group was going to confer on "the position of Maryland in the national 
crisis, and her relations with the South •••• n70 
The activities of this meeting came out a few days later. They had 
decided to hold a conference of "the best informed, most eminent and in-
fluential citizens in the several counties of the State, to be held in 
Baltimore on the lOth of January • • ·" The idea was to ascertain the 
sentiment in Maryland regarding the national situation, to have one more 
try at convening the Legislature, and, if this failed, to , :adopt nsuch 
ulterior measures as may be necessary for a reliable and intelligent ex-
hibition of the position of the State • with regard to the present 
crisis.u7l 
Many BAltimore business men participated in this conference, and in 
the various meetings which emerged from it, but their desire to put Mary-
land on record, through a convention or otherwise, was far from being 
prompted by disunionist motives. Union sentiment among the merchants re-
mained overwhelming. When the conference duly assembled on the morning 
of January 10, the Baltimore City delegation included such strong Union-
ists as William McKim of Johns Hopkins, bankers, and John P. Kennedy, 
author and statesman; no secessionist meeting could have enlisted the sup-
port of these men.72 Although the delegation also contained the names of 
70sun, December 28, 1860. 7lrbid., January 2, 1861. 
72sun, January 11, 1861. See John P. Kennedy, The Great Drama; An 
Appeal to Maryland (Baltimore, 1861), reprinted in Frank Moore, ed.,The 
Rebellion Record, I (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1862), 368-374, for this 
politician's strong Unionist views. (Hereafter cited as An Appeal to 
Maryland. ) .McKim and Hopkins were t:-ro o~ Bal timo:e' s most influential 
capitalists and were constantly actlve lll promotlng the cause of the 
Union, both before and after the outbreak of war. 
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some strong Southern sympathizers,73 this conference in the beginning 
was attended by men of all political faiths, united in an honest desire 
to seek a way out of the current dilemma. The secessionist label could 
be (and was) more aptly applied at a later date. 
After two days deliberations, the conference expressed itself by the 
customary method of adopting resolutions. The first stated that 11Mary-
land is this day, as she ever has been, true to the American Union." The 
second maintained that the Crittenden compromise measures74 would be 
generally acceptable to Marylanders as a "fair and proper settlementn of 
the country's differences. The third provided for a committee to visit 
the Governor, and to request that he let the people vote on the subject 
of a convention, which would be duly called in February if the people so 
decided.75 During the course of the proceedings the delegates questioned 
the right of secession and opposed the policy of coercion--still attempt-
ing to tread a chalk-line which the course of events was fast rubbing out. 
73Exchange, ~, January 11, 1861. Ross Winans, George W. Dobbin, 
and banker J. Hanson Thomas were among the business men in this category, 
along with the pro-southern attorneys S. Teackle Wallis and William Henry 
Norris. John W. Garrett, president of the.Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, was 
also a Southern rights man at this time; for a brief analysis of Garrett's 
views see Festus P. Summers, The Baltimore & Ohio in the Civil War (New 
York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1939), pp.45 ff. 
74The Crittenden compromise suggested (1) restoring the line of 
36°30' as a division between free and slave territories, (2) maintaining 
slavery and slave trade in the District of Columbia without interference 
by Congress, and (3) compensating slaveholders for all runaways not 
captured and returned. 
75sun, American, January 12, 1861. Ross Winans, noted inventor, 
machinist, and railroad architect, was a member of the committee appointed 
to confer with Hicks. 
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The business community again gave striking evidence of its loyalty 
to the Union at the Mass Meeting of January 10, an evening affair at the 
Maryland Institute. William McKim, Benjamin Deford, William E. Hooper, 
and Joseph Cushing, Jr., all noted capitalists, planned the meeting and 
made the necessary arrangements. McKim wrote to Augustus W. Bradford, 
attorney and future Governor of Maryland, asking him to address the 
gathering and hoping that he would lend his "powerful aid in sustaining 
the cause of the Union at this momentous crisis of her fortunes. The ob-
ject of this meeting is to express to our fellow countr,rmen the firm and 
unflinching determination of the citizens of Baltimore to stand by the 
Union, and to assert and maintain her rights, and the rights of her sis-
ter states, under the constitution.n76 To reassure Bradford, who had 
stayed completely out of politics since the defeat of his hero Clay in 
1844,77 McKim added that "no sectional or party questions" -would be dis-
cussed. A petition in favor of the meeting was signed by more than twenty-
three hundred names, nearly all of them business firms,78 and at a gath-
ering of some three thousand workingmen in the Mar,yland Institute on 
January 9, at which a dozen or more manufacturers served as officers, 
it was decided amid cheering to support and attend the Union meeting the 
following evening.79 Even as the chain reaction of secession was starting 
to rattle through the Gulf states, the great majority of Baltimore's 
7~cKim to Bradford, January 3, 1861, Augustus W. Bradford papers, 
Maryland Historical Society, Baltimore, Md. 
??cyclopedia, p. 32. 78American, Clipper, January 7, 1861. 
79Ex.change, January 10, 1861. German H. Hunt, of Poole & Hunt, steam 
engine manufaQturers; David L. Bartlett, of the stove warehouse and foundry 
of Hayward, Bartlett & Co.; David Carson, of Carson, Zimmerman & Co., lum-
ber dealers; Edward Abbott, steam saw and flour mill operator; William E. 
Hooper, owner of the big cotton duck factory at Woodbury, North Baltimore; 
John M. Smith, linseed oil manufacturer; and Charles P. Stevens, junior 
partner in a furniture establishment, were among the business men presid-
ing at this workingmen's meeting. 
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financial, commercial, and manufacturing interests went on record in sup-
port of the Union. 
This support was not unconditional, but it must have appeared so to 
Northern and Southern observers. Between eight and ten thousand people 
jammed the halls of the Maryland Institute on January 10, listened to 
speeches describing the advantages of remaining in the Union and the 
perils attendant upon leaving it, and passed resolutions stressing the 
all-important need for unity of government, condemning secession as ab-
surd, and proclaiming that the national government had a "just claimrt to 
Maryland's "confidence and support.rr80 This was fairly strong language 
from rich and respectable citizens of a slave state in January, 1861. 
True, the group advocated repeal of the personal liberty laws in the 
Northern states and was strongly in favor of the Crittenden compromise 
--had even asked Senator Crittenden to address the meeting. 81 This was 
cold comfort to cotton staters who had already washed their hands of 
compromise and were expecting the border states to join them in a new 
confederacy. The general tone of these Union speeches in Baltimore must 
have sounded like Republicanism itself, or something very little better. 
Indeed, Southerners were about ready to give Maryland up for lost in 
early 1861. All of the other border slave states had placed themselves 
in definite opposition to the policy of coercion by the Federal government, 
80American, Clipper, January 11, 1861. In addition to Bradford, at-
torney William H. Collins and Reverdy Johnson, well known lawyer and 
statesman, addressed the meeting. 
81see letter, Crittenden to \villiam McKim et al., January 2, 1861, 
printed in American, January 11, 1861. The Senator, after expressing his 
thanks, regretted that poor health and legislative duties made it impos-
sible for him to comply, and wished the group his "warm and cherished 
sympathy, in all their Union sentiments •••• " 
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and had otherwise given expressions of sympathy to the Southern cause, 
while little emerged from Maryland save the noise of the big Union meet-
ing. The corrutLi..ttee of six appointed by the conference of January 10 to 
see Governor Hicks ran into a familiar snag: Hicks would not even let 
the question of a convention be decided by popular vote.82 Merchants 
withSouthern customers began to form an idea of what Maryland's present 
course was doing to their business. "I have no hope of selling goods to 
this country this season," lamented the junior partner of a Baltimore 
hardware firm, writing from Georgia. "I have not the shadow of a hope 
for the Union. I regret the position of Maryland--the people here 
complain bitterly of her position.n83 "You can give up all hope of sell-
ing goods out here next spring," he added a few days later.:: "I am sorry 
to see Maryland so backward for I think it is time she has taken a position.n84 
Continuing his travels through Georgia, the partner sent another com-
plaint at the end of the year, complete with italics: 
I would not think of ordering one ·do·ll-ar' s. worth of goods of 
any kind for spring sales. 
In your last letter you still speak of the trouble blowing over. 
Of this I have not the shadow of a hope, for the Union is gone and 
the Southern people will have more use for muskets than hardware. 
What will Maryland do? Where will she be found when our rights are 
trampled upon? Your Union meetings answer with the Black Republi-
cans. Would to God it were otherwise, for to day I am in Georgia 
and for the fiB~t time in my life am ashamed to say I am a l-lary-
lander. • • ·" 
82Radcliffe, op. cit., p. 33. Hicks agreed to consider. the question 
of calling the Legislature if Congress failed to provide for reconcilia-
tion, but this must have seemed suspiciously like stalling tactics to the 
members of the .committee. 
83Roberts to Magruder, December 23, 1860, Magruder, Taylor & Roberts 
papers. 
84Roberts to Magruder, December 28, 1860, ibid. 
85Roberts to Magruder, December 30, 1860, ibid. 
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The other junior partner wrote from South Carolina that all the able-
bodied men had volunteered for military service. "You have never seena 
a more determined set of people in your life •••• The universal cry 
and enquire is 'Taylor why the name of God does not Maryland come out and 
show us what she is going to do' and now let me ask you," he chided the 
head of the firm, "Union-loving as I know you are, if you really hope to 
accomplish anything by holding out.· any longer?tt86 In early Februry 
Taylor stopped in Montgomery and inhaled some of the enthusiasm surround-
ing the inauguration of Jefferson Davis. "I want no better country than 
the Southern Confederation,n he exulted. "There can be no compromise now 
nor hereafter with these People and black republicans. Maryland and Vir-
ginia are looked for to join the South, and ought to do so very soon.n87 
He continued his needling of the front office throughout his Southern 
travels. In Augusta, Georgia, he reported that 11 the sale of goods to 
the Southern Confederacy you may consider as cut off for this season and 
until Maryland goes out. • n88 . . And from Memphis, later in the month: 
"Business appears still to be at a stand still. • • • as the matter now 
stands we cant do a thing nor will we ever unless Maryland joins the South. 
Whenever she does that we are certain of a very heavy trade with the cot-
ton states and not until then. • n89 . . 
Thus goaded by reports such as these from the South, a group of 
86J. H. Taylor to Magruder, January 23, 1861, ibid. 
87Taylor to Magruder, February 1, 1861, ~· 
8BTaylor to Magruder, February 21, 1861, ibid. 
89Taylor to Magruder, Febrmary 28, 1S61, ibid. 
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merchants joined actively in another attempt to secure a convention. Many 
business firms appeared among the four-hundred-odd names requesting citi-
zens of Baltimore "who are in favor of restoring the Constitutional Union 
of the States, and who desire the position of Maryland in the existing 
crisis to be ascertained by a Convention of the people o o on to assemble 
at the Maryland Institute on February 1.90 The presence of such pro-
Southern attorneys and politicians as T. Parkin Scott, Coleman Yellott, 
William H. Norris, Robert M. McLane, S. Teackle Wallis, and ex-Governor 
Enoch Louis Lowe was evidence of the prevailing sentiment at the meeting, 
and neither William McKim nor Johns Hopkins, who had favored a convention 
in the conference on January 10-11, were in attendance this time. On 
the other hand, a few merchants who had cheered at the big Union meeting 
of January 10 had since decided that a convention was necessary.9l The 
events of January may have cause a slight shift in attitude among certain 
business men, away from the Union and toward a more Southern stand, but 
it is hardly likely that many of the merchants desiring a convention 
would have approved of a secession ordinance. The big hope was still 
that Maryland's voice might help t6 reconcile the two sections. 
Nevertheless the tone of the meeting was outspoken in its devotion 
to Southern principles. The inflamed speeches were delivered, criticizing 
Hicks, denouncing the Republicans, and insisting that Maryland must speak 
9~change, Sun, January 31, 1861. Joshua Vansant, George W. Dobbin, 
Lambert Gittings, S. R. Dunnock, H. L. Whitridge, Gustav W. Lurman, 
Hamilton Easter, and Spence & Reid were among the business firms backing 
the meeting. The majority were shipping and commission merchants, dry 
goods jobbers and retailers, etc.; Hugh Sisson, owner of a steam marble 
works, and Thomas Winans were about the only manufacturers in the group. 
George S. Brown, of Alexander Brown & Sons, was the only prominent banker 
mentioned. 
91John W. Bruff, Hamilton Easter, and Thomas Whitridge had backed the 
Union meeting. Bruff, Easter, and Whitridge's son Horatio were now in 
favor of a convention, which was increasingly looked to as a means of 
placing ¥~ryland sympathy with the South. 
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up in order to save the Union. Most extreme of all were the resolutions 
holding that the secession of the Southern states was justifiable under 
the circumstances, and that should compromise fail Maryland would join 
Virginia and go with the South.92 Maryland by her vote for Breckinridge 
in 1860 had indicated where her true interests lay, it was said, yet 
Hicks had refused to let the people be heard at a time when, obviously, 
failure to join the South was tantamount to an alliance with the "black 
Republican" North.93 There was a good deal of cheering, the loudest be-
ing reserved for the declaration that the interests of Maryland were iden-
tidal with those of Virginia.94 Having thus declared themselves, the 
group decided to hold ward meetings throughout the city, selecting five 
persons from each ward who would meet and elect twenty-two Baltimore dele-
gates to a State Convention. It was hoped that this convention, wh±ch was 
scheduled for February 18 with or without the Governor's approval, would 
possess sufficient influence and strength to win official recognition of 
its acts. 
The growing division of sentiment among the business. community(and 
elsewhere) between "Union" and "Southern fights" support,ers was reflected 
by thee comments of the press regarding this convention movement. The Ex-
change felt that it "showed how very large a proportion of our citizens 
regard with anxiety and indignation the position of Maryland and the 
course of Governor Hicks •••• It was a large and influential gathering, 
92sun, February 2, 1861. One resolution adopted by the group in-
cluded a clause recommending non-interference with the District of Colum-
bia, in the event that Maryland should be forced to secede. 
93Clipper, February 2, 1861. 94American, February 2, 1861. 
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and those who took part in it were animated by deep feeling and strong con-
victions. .n95 The §Eg encouraged all "right-thinking" citizens to 
support the decisions of the meeting, since the Governor's refusal to call 
a convention was simply an attempt to "sell the State of Maryland to the 
leaders of Northern fanaticism •••• It remaisn, therefore, for the 
people, in their sovereign capacity, to repudiate the dastardly trans-
action •••• rr96 On the other side, the America.t~., noting that the at-
tendance at the meeting "bore no comparison with the immense masses of 
people who crowded every inch of room in the Hall and vainly sought ad-
m.ittance to its doors on the occasion of the Union meeting" of January 
10, insisted that an "irregularly called 'Sovereign Cavention'" would 
only reflect the sentiments of a minority and would promote needless dis-
cord among Maryland citizens.97 And the ever outspoken Clipper denounced 
the group as a "miserable little handful" of secessionists and "disturbers 
of the public peace" who were seeking to "attache Maryland to the tail 
of the Southern kite •••• u98 
On February 7, the representatives chosen at the ward meetings on 
February 5 met to elect delegates to the forthcoming convention. The sup-
port of a good-sized segment of the business community was evidenced by 
the large number of merchants present from some of the wards, and by the 
fact that half of the twenty-two delegates elected to represent the city 
95Exchange, February 4, 1861. 
96sun, February 4, 1861. 
97American, February 1, February 2, 1861. 
98C1ipper, February 2, 1861. 
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were business men.99 S. Teackle Wallis reminded the delegates that the 
convention was not "sovereign," since the invitation to participate "was 
extended only to those who concurred in _; 9pinion and feeling with the meet-
ing at the Institute" on February l. The members should not, therefore, 
consider that they were acting for the people; they had not yet secured 
popular authority to do this, and the duties and rights of the conven-
tion were to be those of"conference and recommendation--nothing more.nlOO 
Just before the election of delegates, a few business men withdrew 
their names from the list of nominees.lOl This may have been mere unwill-
ingness to serve, but it is likely that the decliners, after surveying the 
situation and listening to Wallis' remarks, had decided that they were 
engaged in something not quite right. Their sentiments may well have 
been expressed by the attorney Henry May, Douglas Democrat with a good 
deal of influence in business circles, who also declined the nomination, 
and explained why. He was, said May, essentially a Union man, but he did 
not approve of the Governor's course and he felt that V~ryland should de-
clare herself, However, believing that the people, when a lawful convention 
99see Exchange, February 6, 1861; American, February 9, 1861. The 
delegates included Joshua Vansant; bantters GeorgeS. Brown and J. Hanson 
Thomas; William G. Harrison, president of the George's Creek Coal and Iron 
Company; Peter Mowell, iron manufacturer and director of the Board of the 
Northern Central Railway; Ross Winans; Ezra Whitman, proprietor of an ag-
ricultural and seed warehouse; Charles H. Myers, liquor importer; John c. 
Brune, president of the Board of Trade; commission merchants Lambert 
Gittings and George H. KYle. The familiar crew of pro-Southern lawyers--
Wallis, McLane, Scott, Yellott, Norris--were also delegates. 
lOOAmerican, February 9, 1861. 
lOlsun, February 9, 1861. Hugh A. Cooper, shipbuilder and director of 
the Board of Trade; Robert Hough, grocer and commission merchant; and 
William Devries, dry goeds merchant, were among the ten nominees who with-
drew. 
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was held, would express themselves in favor of the Union, Nay was "yet 
unwilling to join any partisan or irregular efforts to convene a State 
Convention. The call for the election of the members of your body was 
limited to those only who approved the resolutions of your mass-meeting 
. . . . No good can result, as it seems to me, from a convention so 
formed; but I fear that by the influence of party or sectional ideas 
that it may widen our unha.pp~ differences at a time when we ought to be 
a. united people. • • • nl02 
The city delegates were joined by representatives from the counties 
on February 18, in Baltimore's Maryland Institute Building, and the neon-
ference Conventiow' got under way as scheduled. Judge Ezekiel Chambers 
of Kent County, the presiding officer, opened the proceedings by de-
nouncing secession as 11the greatest curse that has ever fallen upon the 
nation," only to add that "submission and degradation" were far greater 
evils.103 John C. Brune, president of the Board of Trade and member of 
one of Baltimore's most respected mercantile families, joined other 
speakers in opposing coercion, blaming Northern aggcession for the coun-
try's present troubles, and underlining the point that Maryland's rights 
wer~ even more important than the Union.104 After due deliberation, the 
session wound up its activities on the second day by passing the inevitable 
resolutions. It was agreed that authorized representatives from Maryland 
l02May to Samuel W. Smith, February 8, 1861, printed in ~~ February 
9, 1861. 
l03Exchange, American, February 19, 1861. 
104clipper, February 19, 1861. 
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should be sent to conferwith the3 Southern states, and especially with 
Virginia, and that a convention was therefore necessary. The resolutions 
called for an adjournment until March 12 in the hope that the Governor 
would call a convention in the interim; should Virginia secede before 
that date, however, the group was to reassemble immediately and recom-
mend a convention on its own authority. Other resolutions again opposed 
the idea of coercion, which was held to include any attempt to execute 
or enforce laws in a seceded state, and again attacked the North for its 
violation of constitutional rights. A final resolution, after outlining 
Maryland's material and moral intimacy with Virginia, stated that the two 
should act together, first by trying to maintain Southern rights within 
tre Union, and, failing that, by leaving the Union to join the Southern 
confederacy.l05 
All of this was fairly solid Southern doctrine, but it represented 
a point beyond which the delegates at the conference convention would 
not go. When neither the Governor of Maryland nor the state of Virginia 
took the expected action following the February adjournment, the conven-
tion met again as scheduled on March 12. Attendance had falien off con-
siderably, and the only tangible result of two days of haggling was a de-
cision to send a committee to the Virginia convention, then in session, 
d t . t th t . f th t t t 186 D' . t. t · an o wa~ upon e ac ~on o a s a e. ~sun~on sen ~en ID many 
of the speeches and resolutions was stronger than ever, but the moderates, 
l05American, Sun, February 20, 1861 • 
. 106~, Exchange, March 14, 1861. Dr. J. Hanson Thomas, president 
of the Farmers & Merchants Bank, and attorney William H. Norris were the 
Baltimore members of this six-man committee. ,...,,., 
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headed by Judge Chambers, prevented the passage of any outright secession 
ordinances, and the resolutions as finally adopted merely echoed previous 
announcements; the most threatening clause merely stated that a war be-
tween the administration and the seceded states would at once dissolve 
the compact that still bound Maryland to the Union.107 Even though the 
"seceders were in the ascendant," as one Southern rights paper pu it, 
reference to the American flag brought forth waves of applause.108 The 
convention adjourned on March 13, subject tor recall by Judge Chambers, 
and never reassembled. 109 It represented the last concerted effort on the 
part of pro-Southern Baltimore business men to secure the calling of a 
state convention. 
As matters stood just before the outbreak of hostilities, then, the 
Baltimore business community was still largely opposed to secession. The 
majority of them had attended Union meetings and endorsed the Governor's 
policy of keeping Maryland quiet. The group that had favored a conven-
tion was unable, at the last, to come right out in favor of secession. 
They came as clase to it as they dared, but even in a body admittedly 
partisan, the moderate sentiment ultimately won out. The secessionist 
element among the business men was not strong enough to bring any notice-
able pressure on the Governor, nor could it form a group large enough to 
be impressive without including merchants who, however pro-Southern, 
107sun, Clipper, March 14, 1861; American, March 18, 1861. 
108Exchange, March 14, 1861. 
l09see Radcliffe, OE· cit., p. 42. Chambers was about to reassemble 
the "conference convention" after the war began, but considered the move 
unnecessary as soon as Hicks called a special session of the Maryland 
Legislature. 
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balked at the pros~ect of taking Maryland out of the Union. Coercion 
of the Southern states by the Federal government, with civil war in its 
wake, might be another question, but unless and until it arose the gen-
eral sentiment in business circles favored staying in the Union and 
hoping, rather blindly, that everything would turn out all right. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE 'l'RIUMPH OF UNION SENTIMENT 
1. Economic Arguments for and against Secession 
In April, with the Union definitely broken and the possibility of 
civil war daily erowing stronger, the Baltimore business men were forced 
to take stock of their position and decide, if and when the unpleasant 
choice were thrust upon them, which way to jump. Aside from the moral 
and sentimental attachments and the legal and theoretical questions, 
there were strong economic arguments on both sides. For the most part, 
the business man did not bother to put these arguments on paper him-
self. He was usually quite aware of them, and whatever he needed to 
have spelled out for him was readily supplied ~ the more articulate 
lawyers, politicians, and editorial writers. 
The publications of the leading business organizations were under-
standably non-committal. The Board of Trade, with a pro-Southern presi-
dent1 and two staunch Union vice-presidents, 2 spoke sorrowfully of the 
political causes for the nation's business worries, and hoped rather 
vaguely "that a speedy and amicable adjustment of our national troubles, 
consistently with the rights of the South • • • may soon restore to 
our country the degree of prosperity enjoyed prior to the late presi-
dential election. n3 Later in the same report the Board reminded v1hoever 
lJohn c. Brune, commission merchant and agent for the Maryland Steam 
Sugar Refinery. 
2\villiam McKim, banker, and Albert Schumacher, German-born shipping 
and commission merchant. 
3BBOT, 1860, P• 5. 
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might be :interested that Southern cotton production, based upon slave 
labor, was all-:iJnportant to the factories of Europe and the North,4 
but this remark indicated a desire to preserve the Union rather than to 
separate from it. The Corn and Flour Exchange, speaking for one of the 
most important branches of Baltimore trade and industry, remained even 
more firmly astride the fence, and could only suggest relying upon 
Providence :in order to "catch the gleam of returning prosperity.n5 
The city's railroad interests were also more interested in concili-
ation than in taking sides. In late January the presidents of the three 
most important lines serving Baltimore6 met with other railroad execu-
tives in Washington and conferred with Buchanan and General Scott. 
Strongly recommending adoption of the Crittenden compromise measures, 
the rail chiefs maintained that public opinion in the areas served by 
their roads favored dropping the slavery controversy.? 
One of the most widely heard arguments in favor of attaching Mary-
land to the South was concerned with the great number of Southern custo-
mers on the Baltimore merchants' account books. If Maryland remained 
4Ibid., P• 24• 
5corn and Flour Exchange, Annual Report, 1860, p. 5. The directors 
of this organization were almost all Union men, but the president, Henry 
Warfield, leaned increasingly toward the South. 
6John W. Garrett of the Baltimore & Ohio, Samuel Felton of the 
Philadelphia, Wilmington & Baltimore, and Anthony \.Jarford of the Northern 
Central. 
?sun, January 25, 186l.r Thomson of the Pennsylvania, Corning of 
the New York Central, and Mash of the Erie were among the other execu-
tives at this compromise-in~pired railroad convention. Garrett, who had 
offered the services of his road to help put down the John Brown raid, 
was already swinging to the view that maintenance of the Union was all-
important. When the final test came Garrett, a practical business man, 
did what was obviously best for his railroad and placed it firmly in 
the war effort on the side of the federal government. See Summers, 2E• 
~., PP• 45 ff. 
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out of the Confederacy, it was argued, Southerners would turn away from 
their old Baltimore market, lower their tariff, and purchase directly 
8 from Europe. Baltimore in a high-tariff North could not compete in 
the sale of European goods to the South, while the once-popular goods 
of the "hated North,n also handled extensively in Baltimore, would 
naturally be spurned in the cotton states.9 11The prosperity of the 
city of Baltimore,n maintained banker J. Hanson Thomas in a resolution 
proposed at the conference convention on March 13, "is dependent mainly 
on its trade and connection with the South, and • • • the union of the 
State of Maryland with a northern confederacy would give a fatal blow 
to its commercial, manufacturing and mechanical interests.u10 
The manufacturers were told that by remaining in the Union they 
would lose their 11natural customers" in the agrarian South; worse still, 
they could not develop their industries to any great extent when com-
peting with "the superior wealth and population and established trade 
of the North and East •••• n11 On the other hand, industrial Balti-
more in the Southern Confederacy would naturally and readily become 
the workshop for the new country, with infinite possibilities for ex-
pansion and growth.12 Proponents of this line of· reasoning discreetly 
omitted any reference to the Southern free-trade policy, an item more 
8Exchange, March 13, 1861; see 
Baltimore merchant, to E. B. Estes, 
9Exchange, March 13, 1861. 
11Exchange, March 26, 1861. 
also letter from James Hodges, a 
Feb. 20, 1861, in Sun, March 8, 1861. 
lOsun, March 14, 1861. 
12w. Jefferson Buchanan, land's Ho • her Trials and Interests 
in Connexion with the ~lar (Richmond: .West & Johnson, 1864 , p. 46. 
This pamphlet appeared much later in the conflict, but its appeal to 
Maryland to join the Confederacy contained many arguments that must 
have been in circulation ever since the election of Lincoln. 
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appealing to merchants than to manufacturers • 
As for Baltimore's trade with the \'Jest and North, the Southern argu-
ment continued, it would be hopelessly lost should Maryland cling to the 
Union. The big Northern cities would easily "absorb and. d.ividett the 
Western market, and no nNorthern conunerce can ever seek a mart or chan-
nel in Baltimore when emptied of Southern staples--the apple of the 
Northern eye." l!Jccept for tobacco, Maryland and the North produced 
the same crops and without Southern goods could have no items to ex-
change.14 Yet Baltimore could easily become the first commercial city 
of the Confederacy, rivalling New York. As the "nearest·~ safest, most 
accessible Southern port," Baltimore would be readily sought by foreign 
vessels,15 and an enlarged direct trade with RUrope, as one paper in-
sisted, was essential to the city's commercial growth.l6 
Maryland's geographical position in a war between the sections 
threatened to have dire effects on trade and commerce. Secessionists 
pointed out that if Maryland and Virginia were on opposite sides, the 
Chesapeake Bay could be closed to Baltimore shipping by a Confederate 
blockade of the Capes. The city's other main trade rout, the Baltimore 
& Ohio, could even more easily be cut off, since the western section of 
the road and all of its important western terminals lay within Vir-
ginia's borders. Baltimore as a Northern city would thus be deprived 
13see BBOT, 1860, PP• 9-10, and ibid., 1861, pp. 2-5, for the 
strenuous objections to the higher rates of the new Morrill Tariff. 
The Board was composed chiefly of merchants, and argued exclusively 
from the mercantile point of view. 
14Buchanan, op. cit., P• 43. 
16~change, March 14, 1861. 
l5Ibid., P• 44. 
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of her Southern, Western, coastal, and overseas markets, and her swift 
ruination as a commercial center would be the inevitable consequence.17 
As one Baltimore merchant described it: 
We can never remain as the mere caudal appendage of a North-
ern Confederacy. • • • If we should permit ourselves to be sepa-
rated from the slave states, grass would grow in our streets, 
and Baltimore in a few years would present to the eye of the 
civilized world a greater commercial failure than the historian 
has ever recorded since trade took its flight from Venice.lS 
The advocates of the Union were able to answer these arguments 
point by point, and add a few of their own. The loss of the Southern 
market, they began, could never compare with the loss of the Western, 
and when Baltimore joined the South, after putting so much time and 
effort into perfecting a rail link with the West, all of this trade 
would be diverted to New York and Philadelphia.19 Even the pro-Southern 
Exchange cautioned the business men not to confine their trade exclu-
sively to any one section--referring, in this case, to the South--and 
pointed out the great potentialities of the Northwest as a market in 
case the old established patterns were broken.20 "An old shopkeeper" 
reminded his friends that the city's "great works of internal improve-
ments, and her commercial arteries aim principally at the trade of the 
free States," and ·secession would ncut off our railroads from the 
country on which they now depend • . . ·" 21 
17coleman Yellott (state Senator), to Hicks, January 24, 1861, 
printed in Sun, January 26, 1861. 
l8Hodges to Estes, February 20, 1861, op. cit. 
l9speech by Augustus w. Bradford, January 10, 1861, printed in 
American, January 11, 1861. See also editorial in Clipper, Feb. 1, 1861. 
20Exchange, January 23, 1861. 
21Letter to the editors, Exchange, December 25, 1860. 
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Nor, said the Unionists, was the secessionist picture of Baltimore 
as the "great conunercial capital" of the South a valid one. The city 
would be on the periphery of the new nation, not nearly so well situated 
as a distributing point for European goods as were Norfolk, Charleston, 
22 Savannah, or even New Orleans. Believers in "King Cotton" were re-
minded that foreign governments might not prove reliable to the South; 
Britain was already searching for "speedy deliverance from • • • her 
dependence upon the cotton growers of America.n23 Southerners who 
insisted that Maryland was economically inseparable from Virginia were 
forgetting that Virginia's "better half"--the western section, coal and 
farm country served by the Baltimore & Ohio--was pro-Union in composi-
tion. and sympathy, and would undoubtedly break away from the older part 
of the state in the event of secession; furthermore, this western Vir-
ginia was far more important to the trade and industry of Baltimore.24 
It was even suggested that Maryland and western Virginia should unite 
politically and stay in the Union, letting the secession-minded, less 
enterprising inhabitants of southern and eastern Virginia join the Con-
federacy if they chose.25 
Manufacturers and merchants alike were destined to suffer under 
the vaunted Southern free-trade policy. The absence of a tariff would 
22Ibid. See also Kennedy, An A weal to Maryland, in Moore, .2E• 
cit., I, 371-372. 
23American, February 26, 1861. 
2~ennedy, An Appeal to Maryland, in Moore, op. cit., I, 372-373. 
25Clipper, February 1, 1861. 
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ruin Balt:i.Jnore's relatively new industries; "our great steam enginery, 
our railroad apparatus, our heavy works of the foundry, our cast and 
rolled metal, could never hold their own in the presence of free import-
ations from England. n26 And Baltimore business men generally would be 
the greatest losers when the South, minus a tariff, sought revenue in-
stead by means of direct taxation. It was estimated that the current 
Maryland tax rate would be increased eight or twelve times over by the 
demands of the Confederate government, and this draining off of profits 
would place a languishing commerce alongside the ruined industry.27 
If Baltimore avoided all this by staying in the Union, the argument 
went on, she would also discover that her products would not long be 
the object of Southern ttdiscrimination." In time Southerners would 
find that a tariff only on Northern goods was unfeasible, and would 
adopt a policy of uniform free trade, thus enabling Baltimore to regain 
her customers in the cotton states.28 
Turning to geography, the Unionists were able to show that Mary-
land's location was actually the strongest argument in favor of clinging 
to the Union. West Virginia's obvious Union sympathy would prevent any 
real disruption by Southerners of traffic on the B. & o., but no Western 
produce could possibly desire an outlet in a Confederate Baltimore. In 
the other direction, a hostile North with superior maritime power could 
far more readily blockade the entrance to the Chesapeake, and by the 
26Kennedy, An Appeal to Maryland, in Moore, op. cit.,. I, 371. 
27Ibid. See also William H. Collins, First Address to the People 
of Marylaiid, 4th ed. (Baltimore: James Young, 1861), pp. 15-16. 
28Kennedy, An Appeal to Maryland, in Moore, op. cit., I, 371. 
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same token a friendly North could use that same naval strength to keep 
Baltimore's sea routes open.29 Even Southerners admitted that the Poto-
mac ran along the wrong side of the state; the absence of any tangible 
boundary between Maryland and Pennsylvania had created strong economic 
30 ties between the two, and made it a simple matter for Northern armies 
to attack or defend Maryland, as the case might be, in the event of 
war. Finally, the presence of a hostile North along an open border 
would require Maryland slaveholders, for security reasons, to sell their 
slaves down South or depart with them, and Maryland would soon become a 
free state in a slave Confederacy, the object of the same suspicion 
which Southerners had long held toward non-slaveholding communities.31 
Military invasion, naval blockade, high taxes, idle factories, loss of 
all Western, Northern, and foreign trade, and an eventual estrangement 
from the slave states, were pictured as the inevitable results of 
joining the Confederacy. The alternative was not a great deal brighter, 
but from the purely economic standpoint it seemed to have slightly more 
to recommend it--if only because it required less of an adjustment. 
2. The News of Sumter 
On April 13 the news of Sumter started trickling into Baltimore, 
and the business men began to realize that the middle ground could not 
29Ibid., p. 372; Collins, op. cit., pp. 7-8. 
3°Buchanan, !~ryland's Crisis, A Political Outline (Richmond, 1863), 
pp. 14-15, cited by Clark, "Politics in Maryland during the Civil War," 
op. cit., p. 260. In this pamphlet Buchanan was forced to admit, for 
this and other reasons--a strong influx of Northern and foreign popula-
tion, for example--Maryland could never.::join the Confederacy. 
3lcollins, op. cit., p. 11. 
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last much longer. One large group of merchants met at the Eutaw House 
on the evening of the thirteenth and discussed the matter of Federal 
appointments in Baltimore, with the particular object of seeing that 
their man, one Charles J. R. Thorpe, obtained the job of Postmaster for 
the city. A committee of sixteen merchants had gone to 1rV"ashington on 
April 4 in an effort to secure the desired appointment, but reported 
to the meeting that ttthe pressure of important business,n understandably 
enough, had prevented Lincpln or his cabinet from granting an inter-
view.32 Charles W. Lentz, wealthy German dry goods merchant, evidently 
spoke for the entire group when, in the course of a lengthy address, he 
insisted that only Union men should be appointed to office in Balti-
more. Thorpe, argued Lentz, in addition to meeting the other require-
ments for the important position of Postmaster, was "in politics a 
firm, unconditional Union man." In any event the meeting unanimously 
adopted resolutions which embodied Lentz' main arguments, and selected 
a committee of five to have another try at an interview with the Presi-
dent.33 Merchants who so earnestly desired the appointment of Union 
men in the city were obviously eager, even after the outbreak of hos-
tilities, to make their peace with the administration and to cooperate 
with it in business matters; after Sumter such a move amounted to un-
qualified support of the Union. 
The other element reacted immediately after reading about Lincoln's 
32American, April 15, 1861. 
33Ibid. Beside Lentz, the officers at this merchants' meeting in-
cluded William Bridges, dealer in fruits and confections; John H. Lloyd, 
of Parlett & Co., tinplate and metal dealers; William Welsh, wholesale 
tobacco and cigar dealer; Benjamin F. Norris, grocer; H. w. Hiser, cam-
mission merchant; William F. Larrabee, importer and dealer in leather; 
and C. H. Poumairat, provision merchant. 
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call for volunteers. Pro-Southern business men joined in ward meetings 
on April 17 and helped to elect delegates to a Southern-rights conven-
tion, held on the following day, which had as its object some sort of 
opposition "to the coercive policy of the Federal Administration.u34 
The actual session of the convention was secret,35 but the general tone 
of the proceedings was reflected in the resolutions put forth by Ross 
Winans and adopted by the assemblage. It was rather unnecessarily pre-
dieted that· .the government policy of trying to recapture forts in the 
seceded states would result in civil war; Northern militia should not 
be garrisoned in Southern forts anyway, and the presence of Northern 
troops in the District of Columbia was both an insult and a menace to 
Maryland. Finally, the resolutions asked Marylanders to npresent an 
unbroken frontn for the purpose of defending home and fireside, averting 
civil war, and repelling "any invader who may come to establish a mili-
tary despotism over us.n36 
EKcitement throughout the city, meanwhile, was widespread. Churches 
were unusually crowded on Sunday, April 14, the day after Baltimoreans 
had heard about Fort Sumter. During the next few days people gathered 
34Exchange, April 18, 1861. Joshua Vansant, Ross and Thomas Winans, 
Hugh Sisson of the steam marble works, merchant tailors George P. Frick 
and J. A. Hambleton, commission merchants s. R. Dunnock, F. H. Scott, 
James Whiteford and \ATilliam H. Owens, dye-and-chemical manufacturer Rich-
ard J. Baker, and James Hodges, importer of hosiery and dry goods, were 
the business names listed as supporting this convention. 
35Ibid., April 19, 1861. 
36Ibid., April 20, 1861. The Winans resolutions were the only re-
sults of the meeting handed out to the press. In view of the subsequent 
happenings in Baltimore, it is quite probable that, in addition to the 
custcmary chest~thumping, concrete ways and means of opposing the pas-
sage of Federal troops were discussed. There was no other real reason 












frequently about the newspaper offices to learn whatever they could. 
Business was entirely suspended, and rival militia organizations--the 
pro-Southern National Volunteers and the pro-Union men--assembled and 
marched about flexing their muscles, while Southern cockades and Union 
flags alike appeared to the tune of threats and mutterings.37 The 
city's collective blood pressure, stimulated by such items as the 
President's call for volunteers, the secession of Virginia on April 17, 
and the threatening tone of the Winans resolutions, mounted steadily. 
3. The Riot 
On April 19 "the invader," represented by the Sixth Massachusetts 
Regiment of Infantry, fully equipped, plus an unarmed regiment of Penn-
sylvanians, arrived in Baltimore en route to the national capital. On 
the previous day a few companies of Pennsylvania artillery had marched 
through the city to board a B. & 0. train for Washington, accompanied 
by an angry, hissing mob, but no real damage had been done;38 the towns-
people were still working themselves up. They went quite mad for a few 
hours on the 19th, however, and the ensuing riot between ~~ssachusetts 
troops and Baltimore citizens was one of the worst in the city's his-
tory.39 Richard T. Davis, a pro-Southern dry goods merchant, was among 
J7Naturally, all of the papers described the happenings in the city 
in some detail. See esp. EKchange, April 15, 16, 19; Clipper, April 15, 
16, 18, 19; American, April 19. 
38clipper, April 19, 1861. 
39A detailed account of the riot is out of place here. For the best 
description, aside from the rather breathless stories in the daily papers, 
see George William Brown, Baltimore and the Nineteenth of April, 1861, 
Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, Ex-
tra Vol. III (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1887), pp. 42-59. 
Brown, Mayor of Baltimore at the time and one of the leading actors in 
the events of the day, wrote about the riot some twenty-five years after 
it occurred, but made use of newspapers, letters, telegrams, and con-
temporary histories to supplement his memory, and turned out a clear 
and creditable account. 
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those killed, having made the mistake of giving three cheers for Jeff 
Davis and the South at the moment when a trainload of stone-scarred 
Massachusetts boys, fresh out of the tumult downtown, was passing through 
southwest Balt:iJnore on its way to V.fashington.4° For a brief while--
indeed, for the only time during the entire period leading up to and 
during the conflict--the citizens of Baltimore were united about same-
thing. A mob with blood on its face was in the streets, breaking into 
stores and seizing ar.ms and damaging property,41 and it was obvious that 
the arrival of any more Northern troops would precipitate a real, major 
league war. Secessionists who did not want the state occupied by Union 
soldiers and Unionists who did not want the mob to go completely haywire 
and plunge Maryland into the Confederacy were in solid agreement: no 
more troops must go through the city.42 
The authorities immediately took steps to bring things under con-
trol. Governor Hicks, ~~yor Brown, and other leading figures made 
speeches at a huge public gathering in the Monument Square that evening 
in an attempt to pacify the unruly element and to assure the citizens 
that they would not again be "invaded" by Northern regiments. The 
various volunteer militia groups were enlisted under the Board of Police 
for the defense of the city, and Baltimore was placed under martial 
4°Exchange, April 20, 1861; Bro>tn, op. cit., pp. 52-53. 
4lExchange, Clipper, April 20, 1861. Warehouses, hardware stores, 
and any business establishment that might contain some sort of weapon, 
were forcibly entered wherever the proprietors did not open the doors. 
Some stores, in self defense, hastily turned over their weapons to the 
city authorities. Judging from the newspaper accounts, it would not have 
taken long for this ar.ms quest to develop into a plain looting expedition, 
and the merchants affected were probably unable to see the difference 
anyway. 









law, with command of the militia being assigned to Colonel Isaac Ridge-
way Trimble. 43 Hicks and Brown sent a dispatch to Lincoln informing 
him of the riot and asking that no more troops be sent, after which, by 
way of strengthening the request, three prominent citizens caught the 
next train for Washington with a letter from Brown to the President, 
disclaiming any responsibility for further bloodshed if additional 
Northern soldiers tried to pass through Baltimore. 44 Meanwhile the 
militia, acting under orders, burned the railway bridges on the North-
ern Central and Philadelphia, Wilmington & Baltimore, and cut the tele-
graph wires, thus severing all communication between Baltimore and the 
North. No provisions, ar.ms, or coal was allowed to leave the city, and 
steamboats were required to se.cure express permission before clearing 
the harbor.45 To prevent the general excitement from mounting, band-
playing and flag-flying were prohibited, and all the bars were closed.46 
Indeed, it looked very much as though Maryland, or at least Balti-
more, was rapidly and explosively seceding from the Union. Henry M. 
Warfield, President of the Corn and Flour Exchange, returned from Rich-
mond with the news that Virginians were overjoyed at Baltimore's actions, 
and a Virginia customer wrote to the hardware firm of I1agruder, Taylor & 
43charles Howard (President, Baltimore Board of Police) to Trimble, 
April 21, 1861, Isaac R. Trimble papers, Maryland Historical Society, 
Baltimore, Md. For accounts of the speeches see Exchange, April 20, 
1861; Brown, op. cit., P• 56; Radcliffe, op. cit., PP• 54-55. 
44Brown, op. cit., PP• 57-58. John C. Brune, George W. Dobbin, and 
Judge H. Lennox Bond--a Republican--were the letter-bearers. 
45Brown to Trimble, April 22, 1861, Trimble papers. 





Hoberts: "I hope the greatest fear in your city is over with and I hope 
we will have enough Southern troops to protect your State from Lincoln's 
rule •••• n47 vJealthy Union bankers subscribed $500,000 for the de-
fense of the city, while other pro-Union fir.ms donated one hundred dol-
lars each in an effort to speed the military preparations, and the 
machine shops of Ross Winans and Adam Denmead hummed and clanked in the 
production of ar.ms. 48 What with the militia drilling and parading daily 
in the streets, the donation by several merchants of bread and provisions 
to feed the troops,49 and the blanket prohibition on the export of all 
foodstuffs, weapons, and coal, Baltimore began to look more and more 
like an armed camp, preparing for a state of siege. And when Governor 
Hicks finally capitulated and summoned the Mar,yland Legislature into 
its long-awaited special session, the election of a Southern-rights 
delegation from the city was completely unopposed.5° 
It was a dark period for the Union cause in Baltimore. Fear of 
47Ibid.; Davidson to Magruder, April 21, 1861, Magruder, Taylor & 
Roberts papers. 
48 John Fulton, The "Southern-Ri htsn and "Unionn Parties in Ma -
land Contrasted (Baltimore: W. M. Innes, 1863 , p. 15• This violently 
pro-Southern pamphlet aimed at showing how completely secessionist Balti-
more became immediately following the riot; bankers Johns Hopkins, Col-
mnbus O'Donnell, and John Clark, Union men all, had subscribed the 
$500,000, and eight Union houses were named as contributing $100 each. 
See also American, April 23, 1861; Trimble to Howard, l~y 13, 1861, 
Tri.inble papers. 
49clipper, April 24, 1861. James D. Mason, cracker-baker, was spe-
cifically named as having contributed food; ttother merchants," according 
to the paper, were doing likewise. 
5°Fulton, op. cit., p. 15; Clipper, April 23, 1861; American, April 
25, 1861. Nine thousand votes were cast for a single Southern-rights 
ticket, with no opposition ticket put forward. Since the city had cast 
over thirty thousand votes in the last Presidential election, the oppo-
sition evidently thought it wiser to stay away from the polls in the 
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Northern reprisals after the riot and a general opposition to the idea 
of helping the Federal government coerce the seceded states had evi-
dently prompted one-time Union business men to aid in preparing the 
cityrs,;defenses, and it was widely felt that Maryland, now faced with 
the choice, would join the Confederacy rather than help in making war 
upon it.51 Leopold Blumenberg, German-born manufacturer who answered 
Lincoln's call for volunteers by retiring from business and starting to 
recruit a Maryland regiment, was mobbed by Southern sympathizers, and 
saved from hanging only by the presence of a strong police guard at his 
house.52 A pro-Southern mob also attacked and damaged the presses of 
the pro-Republican Wecker, and forced the liberal German Turner societies 
to flee the city.53 Both the police marshal, George P. Kane, and the 
commander of the militia, Isaac R. Trimble, were favorable to the South;54 
vote for delegates to the Legislature. Pro-Southern business men John 
C. Brune, Henry \varfield, Ross Winans, J. Hanson Thomas, and William G. 
Harrison were among the ten Baltimore delegates. The city election was 
necessary because charges of fraud in a previous election had caused 
the !~ryland House of Delegates, in its last regular session, to de-
clare the Baltimore seats vacant. 
51Exchange, April 22, 24, 26, 1861. 
52cycloPedia, pp. 477-478. In spite of this opposition, Blumenberg 
succeeded in raising his regiment--the Fifth Maryland Volunteers--and 
fought well under McClellan on the Peninsula and at Antietam. A Prus-
sian officer before coming to Baltimore in 1854 to go into business, 
Blumenberg was wounded at Antietam, breveted brigadier general for gal-
lantry on the field, and later, on his recovery, appointed Provost 
Marshal for the Third Maryland District. 
53cunz, The Maryland Germans, pp. 305-306. Most of the Turners, who 
had formed the bulk of Baltimore's insignificant Republican element before 
the war, immediately joined the Union ar.my. The Wecker was able to re-
sume publication within a week or ten days. 
54Kane was constantly accused of being a secessionist by the pro-
Union press. Though even his enemies admitted that he had done every-
thing possible to prevent bloodshed on the 19th of April, he shortly 
afterward announced his determination to fight, if necessary, all Union 
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the police were accused of seizing only Union men in the various dis-
turbances following the riot, and a few policemen lost their jobs for 
failing to enforce the prohibition on the flying of American flags.55 
"The disunion feeling has become very decided here, n wrote one B3.lti-, 
more firm, "and the general sentiment among those of us who have here-
tofore stood up for the Union, is that it is of no use to struggle for 
it any longer. 
Actually, there was evidence that the contributions of Baltimore 
bankers and merchants to the defense of the city stood for something 
other than fear of Northern invasion. The men who subscribed money, 
donated provisions and arms, and otherwise aided in the military organ-
ization of Baltimore, dreaded the approach of Union soldiers not because 
they were in~ding Maryland soil, but because of the effect another en-
counter might have on the mob. The ttroughs" who were storming about on 
the nineteenth thirsting for more Northern blood had, before being 
brought under control by the authorities, managed to do a little looting 
--not much, but enough to put the fear of God into staid property-
holders; one more Massachusetts regiment, they felt, and we will not 
only be dragged out of the Union by a lawless mob, but have our stores 
troops passing through Maryland. He was sufficiently suspect during the 
period of Federal occupation of Baltimore to be arrested by General 
Banks on June 27, 1861, and confined in Fort McHenry. See Radcliffe, 
op. cit., pp. 66-67; Brown, op. cit., P• 97. Trimble, when the militia 
was disbanded, left Baltimore and joined the Confederate army, eventu-
ally becoming a major-general. 
55clipper, April 20, 26, 30, 1861. 
56smith & Chappell to L. Downer, April 29, 1861, Smith & Atkinson 
papers, Maryland Historical Society, Baltimore, Md. 
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ransacked in the process. 
It had been a hard winter for the Baltimore -vwrking men. Thousands 
had lost their jobs, and according to an inquiry made by Marshal Kane of 
several manufacturers, many establishments were maintaining a skeleton 
force on a part-time basis, "not because we required their labor, but be-
cause they required bread.n57 Mechanics and laborers had held meetings 
to discuss their plight and request aid from the city, but the relief 
measures had been half-hearted and inadequate,58 and on April 8, less 
than two weeks before the riot, a large group of unemployed workers met 
and drew up an outline of their difficulties, closing their petition with 
the ominous suggestion that if relief were not forthcoming, the jobless 
would have to seek sustenance nin any manner that presents itself." At 
another meeting held two days later, it was decided that this language 
was too strong and the petition was dropped in favor of a milder one, 
but not before it had appeared in the press; thoughtful observers could 
hardly have missed the point.59 
Conditions were thus ripe for a disturbance, and when hot-blooded 
young Southern sympathizers and 1rvorking men with too much time and not 
57EXchange, l~rch 25, 26, 1861. In an editorial calling for aid 
to the working men, the paper claimed that 4,200 more laborers had been 
laid off during the first three months of 1861 than during the correspond-
ing period a year before. In the same issue appeared the statements of 
a dozen or so manufacturers, showing the reduction in their labor forces 
since 1860--ranging from twenty-five to eighty per cent--and adding that 
many still on the pay-rolls were only employed for twenty or thirty 
hours a week. 
58American, February 1, 1861; Exchange, March 25, 1861; Clipper, 
April 9, 1861. 
59Clipper, April 9, 1861. 
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enoueh money were suddenly confronted with a 1-'Jassachusetts regiment, 
some sort of explosion was inevitable. The order-loving citizens prompt-
ly made sure that the events of April 19 could not be repeated. Owing 
to the enrollment and organization of volunteers under General Trimble, 
as the Mayor himself put it, "many who would otherwise have been the 
disturbers of the peace became its defenders.n60 On 1\fa.y 6 the authori-
ties felt that "the immediate and pressing danger to the safety of the 
city has ••• passed away," and ordered the volunteers disbanded, 61 
even though Northern troops were openly moving closer to Baltimore 
from Annapolis on the south and Pennsylvania on the north; the danger 
from without was greater than ever, but it was not the danger that the 
better element had been worrying about. General Trimble, in a final 
letter to the Mayor summarizing the activities of the volunteer force, 
wrote: 
I will here conclude, by expressing the opLnlon, that the 
organization of these associations, and turning the popular ex-
citement into this channel, giving a large and excited popu-
lace the idea that they were acting, as it were, officially 
as a police force, to defend the city and preserve order, has 
prevented many tumults, preserved private property, often 
threatened, and during the excitement, inspired confidence • • • 
that the city could be preserved, from internal disorder and 
riot, and from the attack of disorderly assailants from 
without •••• 62 
The seeming unanimity \v.ith which merchants and bankers helped to organ-
ize the city by no means indicated a desire for secession. 
60Brown, op. cit., P• 63. Brown added that many secessionists who 
had joined the military groups hoping that war was in the offing grew 
disgusted with the determination on the part of the authorities to keep 
the peace, and left Baltimore to join the Confederate ar.my. 
61Howard to Trimble, May 2, 1S61; Mayor Brown to Trimble, May 6, 
1861, Trimble papers. All arms were ordered turned over to the Marshal 
of Police upon dismissal of the militia. 
62Trimble to Brown, May 8, 1861, ibid. 
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4. The Reactinn 
It did not take the Baltimore business men long to discover that 
all of these efforts to make the city defensible were rapidly stifling 
trade and conmmrce. Observing that order had generally been restored 
within a week after the nineteenth of April, they began to come out 
strong~y for a lifting of the restrictions and a restoration of the 
broken lines of trade. They got results, too. The Corn and Flour 
Exchange, cooperating with representatives from the Provisions Exchange, 
held meetings, circulated petitions, and sent committees to the city 
authorities regarding the prohibition on exports, 63 and on May 1, "in 
compliance with the unanimous wish of the mercantile community, tt the 
11a.yor and Police Commissioners removed the ban on the export of pro-
visions, breadstuffs, and coal. 64 On May 2 the Corn and Flour Exchange 
played host at a large gathering of merchants, assembled to discuss the 
matter of restoring communications with the North. The group wanted 
the railroad bridges repaired and trade with the Northenn states resumed; 
they were tired of restrictions and felt that the dangers to Baltimore's 
safety no longer existed; and they drew up a petition, to be presented 
to the Maryland Legislature by a committee of ten, stating these facts 
and asking that rail and telegraph lines be restored. 65 The Board of · 
Trade also appointed a committee to work on this problem, and although 
the Legislature refused to sanction a re-opening of the Northern rail 
63Exchange, April 30, 1861. 
64Brown and Howard to Trimble, April 25, 1861; Howard to Trimble, 
May 1, 1861, Trimble papers. 
65Baltimore Patriot, May 2, 1861; American, Exchange, May 3, 1861. 
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links on the erounds that it would facilitate a militar.y invasion of 
the state,66 the bridges were repaired by the middle of l~y and trains 
again began running northward to Philadelphia and New York. 67 When it 
came to matters of trade, the business community as a whole obviously 
considered its Northern ties too important to sever, coercion and civil 
war notwithstandilig. 
Undoubtedly, the brief taste of what would happen to their cam-
merce when cut off from the Union also prompted many business men to 
take leading parts in the various Union meetings of late April and early 
May. The first of these, held on April 29, marked the real beginnings 
of a definite resurgence of Union sentiment. Officered in each case 
largely by business men, the gatherings repeatedly professed unwavering 
loyalty to the Union, condemned the mob violence of April 19, recam-
mended opening all of the state's lines of travel to the Federal govern-
ment, blasted the Southern sympathizers in the then assembled Maryland 
Legislature, and advocated the calling of a state Union convention 
which could act, no matter what the Legislature might decide to do, to 
keep Maryland from seceding or making any disloyal moves. 68 Delegates 
to a city convention, elected in ward meetings by those in sympathy 
with the idea, met on May 7 and made plans for the nomination of good 
Union candidates in the forthcoming June election of congressmen from 
Maryland's third and fourth districts. The convention also discussed 
66Radcliffe, op. cit., P• 79. 
67clipper, l~y 7, 10, 12, 1861; BBOT, 1861, p. 4. 
68For accounts of these meetings, see the daily papers during the 
period April 29-May 15, especially the Clipper and American. The lists 
of presiding officers at the different meetings invariably included a 
substantial number of business men. 
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the proceedings of the state Legislature, agreed that a secession ordi-
nance was not likely to be passed by that body, looked forward to the 
state Union convention scheduled for May 24, and planned to prepare an 
address to the citizens which would stress the advantages of remaining 
true to the Union.69 
Perhaps the best expression of the dominant feeling in business 
circles at this time was put forth by Henry Jfay, the prominent attorney 
and Douglas Democrat who had a large business following in the city and 
who later was elected to Congress from Maryland's third (Baltimore) 
district. On l~y 14 May expressed his views in a letter answerin~ a 
group of business men and other leading citizens who had invited him 
to be their candidate in the June election. After thanking his sup-
porters and agreeing to enter the campaign, May announced that he was 
strongly opposed to the Republican Party, but that secession was no 
remedy, and that l"faryland should remain in the Union at all costs, 
endure the evils of the present arnrrli1istration, and seek redress only 
through constitutional means; he wanted no parts of a revolution which, 
in his opinion, would destroy country and constitution alike.7° He 
desired peace and detested the policy of coercion as much as ever, but 
he wanted to stay in the Union, and this was exactly what the majority 
of the business community wanted to hear. 
69clipper, May 8, 1861. Well over half of the delegates to this 
city Union convention were bankers, manufacturers, and merchants. 
70r,etter from Henry May, May 14, 1861, printed in American, May 15, 
1861. Merchants Lambert Gittings, W. H. D. C. Wright, Eugene and F. A. 
Levering, Robert Leslie, James Hooper, Jr., Henry A. Thompson, A. H. 
Stump, Daniel Warfield, and George P. Thomas were among those who had 
invited Hay to run for Congress. For a discussion of the election in 
June see Clark, nPolitics in Maryland during the Civil vfar," op. cit., 
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Business men who felt differently were represented in the Legis-
lature by the recently elected Southern-rights delegation from Baltimore.71 
Hicks had originally summoned the Legislature to meet on April 26 at 
Annapolis, but when General Benjamin F. Butler, in order to avoid the 
excited Baltimoreans, moved his Union troops to Annapolis by water and 
landed there on April 21, the Governor de¢ided that the presence of 
Northern soldiers would make the Maryland capital a bad place in which 
to conduct business, and shifted the place of assembling to Frederick.72 
In view of the post-riot excitement, the widely felt opposition to 
aiding the Federal government in making war upon the Confederacy, and 
the known pro-Southern attitude of many of the Maryland delegates and 
senators, no one would have been overly surprised had the Legislature 
passed a seces-sion ordinance.73 
Both Houses immediately set forth resolutions denying their consti-
tutional power to do this, and although it was strongly implied that 
secession could be effected by a state convention, the lawmakers ended 
up by refusing to call a convention, either. They protested repeatedly 
and vigorously against the actions and policy of the Federal government, 
XXXVI (December, 1941), PP• 3$2-3$3, 38$. }By was more moderate than 
his unconditional Unionist opponent, Henr.y Winter Davis, but it was 
really a contest between two Union men, with the State-rights candi-
date, R. M. McLane, receiving a negligible number of votes. 
71see above, P• 50. 
72see Radcliffe, op. cit., pp. 68-70. Keeping the Legislature 
away from the influence of Northern troops was interpreted by Southern 
sympathizers as a sign that Hicks had abandoned his Union attitude. 
Actually, the Governor was also influenced by the knoWn Union sentiment 
in Frederick, which he hoped would restrain the secessionist element 
among the lawmakers. 
73The actions of the Legislature, which fall somewhat outside the 
scope of this work, are described in Radcliffe, op. cit., ch. VIII. 
100 
even demanding that the Confederacy be recognized, but this repre-
sented the extent of their "secessionist" activities.74 A ttsafety 
bill," aimed at setting up a commission with somewhat dictatorial powers 
which could take control of the state away from Hicks and, therefore, 
doubtless push it out of the Union, was introduced in the Senate by the 
ardent disunionist Coleman Yellott, but soon encountered strong and 
violent opposition, and dropped out of sight. The business men among 
the Baltimore delegates, representing Southern sentiment among the mer-
cantile community, voted against this "safety billtr right from the be-
ginning; furthermore, a committee appointed by the Union convention 
then meeting in Baltimore returned from Frederick with the statement 
that the Baltimore delegates had remained "totally opposed" to any 
action om:. the part of Maryland. 75 
At the last minute, then, the Southern element had stepped up to 
the brink of secession only to back away. Union feelings in Baltimore 
were stronger than ever, and the issue was settled once and for all on 
May 13 by General Butler, who moved troops into the city from Annapolis 
and occupied Federal Hill. The citizens, by all accounts, evinced only 
74Maryland General Assembly, House of Delegates, Committee on Fed-
eral Relations, Re ort of the Committee ••• in Re ard to the Callin 
of a Sovereign Convention Frederick, Md.: E. S. Riley, 1861, passim. 
The resolutions contained in this report, which were adopted by a 43 
to 13 vote in the House, denounced the government and bewailed Mary-
land's positioiT9 but admitted that neither a convention nor any other 
attempt at resistance was feasible. 
75Exchange, May B, 1861. John W. Randolph, a pro-Union lumber mer-
chant, was a member of this committee appointed to see what the Balti-
more delegation--Warfield, Harrison, Brune, Winans, Thomas, et al.--had 
been up to. The committee reported that the delegation, though holding 
different political views, were "honorable and truthful men" who agreed 
with the Unionists that Maryland should not attempt to oppose the Fed-
eral government. s. Teackle Wallis assured the convention in Baltimore 
that the delegates had opposed the Safety Bill. 
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curiosity and enthusiasm at this reappearance of the "invader.n76 livithin 
a day after Butler's arrival more than a dozen firms had written him, 
offering to supply his·troops with provisions, bread, mattresses, blan-
kets, lumber, tents, stoves, ar.mS, and sleeping space.77 Whether 
willingly or resignedly, the great majority of the business men had 
worked to keep Maryland in the Union, and the minority, even in the 
turbulent days foll~g the nineteenth of April, had always lacked the 
nerve or the support, or both, to advocate secession openly ~nd unequiv-
ocally. Commercial and industrial Baltimore had shown itself to be 
more of a Northern than a Southern city. 
Conclusion 
In choosing between Union and secession, the merchants were not 
so much concerned with following or not following their "economic inter-
est" as with determining precisely what that economic interest was. 
There were good arguments on. both sides, and men in the same line of 
business could study the situation, strict~ from the profit viewpoint, 
and come up with opposite answers. For example, the wealthy German 
merchants who dominated Baltimore's large tobacco·:,trade and belonged to 
the exclusive Ger.mania Club were genera~ sympathetic to the tobacco-
raising South,78 yet some of the club's most eminent members--Albert 
76clipper, American, May 14, 1861. 
77see letters from Baltimore business houses to Butler, May, 1861, 
Benjamin F. Butler papers, u. s. Library of Congress, Washington, D. c. 
78cunz, ttThe Maryland Germans in the Civil War, n op. cit., pp. 
414-415, 418. Cunz, The Ma£Yland Germans, PP• 310-311, covers the same 
ground. 
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Schumacher, Charles W. Lentz, and Georg W. Gail--were Union men. A 
clear majority of the banking, flour-milling, mining, manufacturing, 
coal, and lumber interests supported the Union, but in each case there 
were notable exceptions.79 Importers, wholesalers, and retailers, 
dealing in such varied products as dry goods, liquors, coffee, hard-
. ware, boots and shoes, straw goods, provisions, oysters, hats, clothing, 
drugs, and guano, could be found on both sides, with the Union men 
predominating in almost every instance.80 
As .-m.s true throughout the country, place of birth was not always 
a safe guide. Jesse Marden, Baltimore manufacturer, was gorn in New 
Hampshire and had worked for years in Boston, yet remained an outspoken 
opponent of the policies of the Federal government,Sl while shipping 
79E.g., bankers George s. Brown and J. Hanson Thomas, manufacturers 
Ross and Thomas Winans and Hugh Sisson, miller Henry M. Warfield, mining 
president John w. McCoy, lumber dealer Joseph H. Boyd, and William G. 
Harrison, president of the George's Creek Coal and Iron Company, were 
Southern-rights men. Most of the .ttbig names" in these fields, however, 
appeared consistently in the Union camp. 
80rt was, of course, impossible to determine the sympathies of 
all the business men in any one category, but a fair sampling was ob-
tained from the business names supporting one cause or the other in 
the various meetings and conventions. The Union supporters.in each 
field were invariably more numerous, but each branch of trade had at 
least one or two nsouthern-rights men.tt Cf. American, January 7, 1861, 
and Clipper, December 22, 1860,for lists of merchants; the for.mer 
group sponsored the big Union meeting of January 10, and the latter 
favored a session of the Legislature, supposedly for the purpose of 
placing Maryland on the side of the Southern states. See also the lists 
of officers at the Union meetings following the riot, in American, April 
29, May 1, l~y 3, May 15, 1861; ~change, May 6, 1861; Clipper, May 4, 
May 6, 1861. The Biographical Cyclopedia, in its hundreds of sketches 
of leading Baltimore merchanys and manufacturers, occasionally mentioned 
the sympathies of its subjects during the war; between eighty and ninety 
per cent were Unionists. 
81cyclopedia, pp. 224-225. 
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merchant William Applegarth, Virginia-born and a slaveholder, supported 
both the Union cause and the Republican Party during the war. 82 Families 
were split. The Mayer brothers, Brantz and Charles F., sons of one of 
Baltimore's wealthiest German merchants, took opposite sides, 83 and 
Thomas E. Hambleton, dry goods merchant and president of the Maryland 
Fire Insurance Company, praised the Unionist course of Governor Hicks84 
onlY to see his two sons, also business men, actively support the Con-
federacy.85 
Union men among the business community not only far outnumbered the 
pro-Southern element, but were generally willing to give their cause 
more unconditional support. At no time during the dark days between the 
election of Lincoln and the occupation of Baltimore by Butler's Northern 
troops did the Southern-rights merchants actually come out for secession. 
They voted for Breckinridge in 1860 in the name of Southern rights; they 
took part in meetings aimed at securing a state convention or a session 
of the Legislature; and they were determined to have no part in coercing 
the South, but in the absence of strong popular support they evidently 
felt that a stronger stand was impossible. Their failure to capitalize 
on the temporary, but widespread, resentment against the North fol-
lowing the April 19 affair was perhaps a realization that military 
resistance at this time was futile; in any event, the pro-Southern 
82Ibid., P• 93 • 83Ibid., PP• 679, 711. 
8~ambleton to Hicks, January 3, 1861, Hicks papers. The Governor's 
name, said Hambleton, '~11 stand out in the History of the stricken and 
bleeding country as the man and patriot who saved it by his firnmess"--
a reference to the Governor's refusal to summon the Legislature or call 
a convention. 
85cyclopedia, p. 261. 
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business men who took their seats in the House of Delegates on April 
26 never supported any of the moves which might have led to the seces-
sion of 1~ryland. This secession, had it occurred at any time after 
the first of the year, would doubtless have been accepted by most of the 
pro-Southern merchants and actively welcomed by others, but their unwil-
lingness to take a definite, unequivocal stand on the subject remained 
constant, whatever their private feelings might have been. 
In 1860, the majority of the merchants had voted for Bell as a 
sort of "Southern-rights Unionist." During the winter, an even greater 
majority had endorsed the Governor's policy of refusing to call a ·con-
vention or convene the Legislature. They had indicated this support 
in their circulars and Union mass meetings, and even more by their 
generalp:J;ssivity; Hicks could hardly have pursued his course so con-
fidently in the face of strong pressure brought to bear by a_hostile 
mercantile community. The merchants, after all, could get things done' 
when they wanted to. They were able to secure a lifting of the ban on 
exports in the post-riot days, and they agitated with equal success for 
a restoration of the railroad and telegraph lines to the North. They 
doubtless hoped, even at the last, that their support of the Union would 
not entail taking part in a coercive war upon the South, but ~1en, having 
elected to stay in the Union, they realized that neutrality was impos-
sible they swallowed their disappointment and joined in the war effort.86 
86For example, more than fifty of Baltimore's leading capitalists 
were members of a committee, appointed by Governor Bradford ~Hicks' suc-
cessor) in July, 1862, whose goal was to help, financially and otherwise, 
in the raising of Maryland volunteers for the Union a~. See letter, 
Bradford to Gerard T. Hopkins, July 17, 1862, Gerard T. Hopkins papers, 
Maryland Historical Society, Baltimore, l1d. 
Hundreds of business men joined the Baltimore Union Club, which was 
I 
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If the merchants did follow their econanic interest, then most of 
them were quite correct in deciding to stick with the Union. But the 
factors that influence a man's decision at such times are almost impos-
sible to determine, and the merchants, like the rest of the people, were 
pulled by many loyalties and attachments in 1861, nowhere more than in 
the border states. No matter how hard the business man might have tried 
to choose the better "economic" solution to his problem, his emotions 
and background were almost boundtto interfere--if only by the secret 
method of convincing him that one econonlic answer was better than another. 
Even while they weighed the relative chances of profit in Confederate 
Baltimore and Union Baltimore, a deep regard for the South and its insti-
tutions was waging the inevitable tug-of-war against patriotism and the 
status quo. 
Sympathy in business circles for the Southern cause did not, of 
course, die out when Butler's troops camped on Federal Hill, nor in the 
r 
long roll-call of battles and campaigns that followed, and many mer-
chants must have felt that they were staying in the Union through no 
choice of their ,awn. Nevertheless they had consistently backed away 
from the alternative during the preceding months• From the election of 
Lincoln to the firing on Fort Sumter, and beyond, the general verdict 
among business men had been that the Republi?an Party was bad but seces-
sian was worse; this, perhaps, is an indication of "economic interest." 
organized in 1863 to promote the cause generally and to bring good loyal 
men together. A "Union man" in 1863, unlike his counterpart two or three 
years before, did not sin1ply favor preservation of the Union; he was 
actively engaged in preserving it, by supporting a war effort and the 
administration that waged it. See the Union Club Record Books, Vol. II, 
"Constitution and Signatures,u for a list of members. A great many of 
the merchants who supported Hicks in 1861 joined this club, forgetting 
even their scruples against "coercion." "' 
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By the same token, merchants who later gave active support to the adminis-
tration and the war may have done so as soon as they discovered that it 
paid off. It is probably safe to say that economic interest, combined 
in some indeterminate ratio with patriotism, and strengthened by a 
strong sense of what was practicable, kept the Baltimore business com-
munity loyal to the Union during the secession crisis, and that this 
loyalty in turn prevented the secession movement in the state from 
gaining any real momenttun. 
APPENDIX 
TABLE 5 











Tobacco & manQfactures 
Fruit, all types 
Fish & fish oils 
Wares, earthen & willow 
Salt 
Value 

















Soda, ash & caustic 
Dolls & toys 
Flax & linens 
Rags 
Hair 





All other (137 items) 
Total 
a 
Source: BBOT, 1860, PPo 52-53. 
bEstimated. See p.6. 
TABlE 6 
BALTD-l:ORE EXPORTS, 1860, IN ORDER OF VALUE* 
Commodity Value Commodity 
(in ooo• s) 
Tobacco $ 3,966 Indian corn 
Flour 2,154 I1Ieal, corn & rye 
Provisions Candles, all types 
Beef 92 Sugar, refined 
Butter 71 Coal 
Cheese 19 Rice 
Hams & bacon 79 Iron & manufactures 
Lard 355 Tea 
Pork 157 Gold 
Tallow 80 Gold & silver coin 
Total Provisions 853 Biscuit & bread 
Wheat 841 Naval Stores 
Cotton & manufactures 565 All other (52 items2 
Wood & wood products 331 Total 



































IMPORTs, 186o, BY PORTS M~D PRINCIPAL ca~~ODITIEs* 
(In J'.tillions of Dollars) 
Total New 
u.s. York Boston Phila.. Balt. 
Total 362.1 233.6 39.3 14.6 10.2 
Woollen goods 37.9 34.0 1~1 1.2 .2 
Silk goods 32.9 30 .. 7 1.4 .1 -
Cotton goods 32.5 22.6 4.1 1.8 o3 
Sugar 31.0 20.7 3.2 2.5 3.0 
Coffee 21.8 8.5 1 .. 0 lo7 3.3 
Iron, steel & mfrs. 21.5 12.3 3.0 1.4 .4 
Linens & mfrs. of fl~ 10.7 8.6 .7 .5 -
Raw hides & skins 10.5 6.9 2.3 .4 .2 
Tea 8.9 8 .. 3 .2 - -
Specie & bullion 8 .. 5 2.3 - - -
Tobacco & mfrs. of 6.,0 3.3 .1 .1 .2 
Tin & mfrs. of 5.8 4~5 .5 ~2 -
Molasses 5.2 1.6 .8 ~5 .3 
Spirits, distilled 5.1 3.4 .. 4 .3 -
Leather & mfrs. of 5.1 4.5 .2 - -
Wool, raw 4.8 2.4 2.2 - .1 
Wines 4.7 2~9 ~1 - -
Chin aware, etc. 4.5 2.4 o5 .5 .1 
Fruits 4 .. 2 2 .. 4 o7 .1 .1 
Laces 4 .. 0 3.5 .3 - -
Clocks & watches 2~9 2.6 .2 - -
Linseed 2~7 .8 1.8 - -
Soda, all types 2.5 1~3 .3 .6 .1 
Glass, etc. 2.1 1~7 .2 - -
Clothing, ready made 2~1 1~5 .1 - -
Gunny cloth, bags 2.0 .2 1.3 - -
Lead & mfrs. of 1.8 1.6 .1 - -
Furs 1.8 L7 - - -
J ewe1ry, gems, etc. 1.7 1.5 .1 - -
Rubber & rnfrs. of 1.6 1~3 ~1 - -
Copper 1.6 .4 .4 - .6 
Hats & bonnets 1.6 1.5 - - -
·Rags 1.5 1.0 ~3 - -
Indigo 1.4 ~6 .7 - -
Salt 1.4_ .3 .1 .. 1 .1 
11Artic1es from Brit. 
Provinces under 





















1.2 .. 3 
.6 -
.4 -- -- -- -
.1 -
..1 -
.. 1 .1 
.2 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -
.3 -
- -
*Sources: Report on Commerce and Navigation, 1860, pp.404-523; BBOT, 1860, 
pp.52-53. The Baltimore figures are for the calendar year; the other figures are 
for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1860. 
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TABLE 8 
EXPORTS, 1860, BY PORTS AND PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES~f. 
(In Hi.lli.ons of Dollars) 
jrotal New New 
u. s. York ~ost. Phi.la. Balt. Orl's 
DOlvJESTIC EXPORTS 
Total ~73.1 120.6 13-5 5-5 10.8 107.8 
Cotton 1191.8 12.4 .3 - - 96.1 
Specie & bullion 56.9 50.3 2.3 - - .2 
Tobacco & mfrs of 19.2 2.6 .6 .1 3.9 7-4 
Flour 15-4 6.6 1.0 1.0 2.1 ·5 
Cot ton r;oods 10.9 5.9 2.4 - ._2 .2 
Iron & mfrs of 5.7 3.2 .4 .6 .1 -
Lard 4.5 2.0 .1 .1 .3 1.2 
vJheat 4.0 2.3 - .1 .8 -
Lumber, wood mfrs 6.7 1.5 ·9 ·3 ·3 ·3 
Naval Stores 3.8 2.7 .1 - - -
Pork 3.1 1.6 .3 .1 .2 -
Beef 2.6 1.8 .1 .2 .1 -
Rice 2.5 1.0 .1 - .1 -
Indian corn 2.3 1.1 - .2 .3 .1 
Staves & headings 2.3 1.3 - - - ·4 
Whale oil 2.3 2.0 .1 - - -
Hams & bacon :-::2:~2 1.5 -- .1 .1 -
Livestock 1.8 .3 - - - -
Copper, brass, etc, 1.6 1.4 - - - -
Oil cake 1.6 1.1 .1 .1 - -
Tallow 1.6 1.0 .1 .2 .1 .2 
Cheese 1.5 1.4 - - - -
Skins & furs 1.5 1.3 - - - -
Spirits, distilled 1.4 .5 .5 - - -
Butter 1.1 .7 .1 .1 .1 -
Drugs & Medicines 1.1 .8 - - - -
Household furn. 1.0 ·4 .3 - - -
Rye, oats, etc. 1.0 ·4 - - - -
Hides, raw 1.0 .2 - - - .3 
FOREIGN ~EXPORTS 
26.9 Total 17.5 1.6 - .1 .6 
TOTAL EXPORTS, 


































~~Sources: Report on Commerce and Na VJ.ga t:I..On, 1860, pp. 310-402, BBOT, 
1860, PP• 54-55· The Baltimore figures are for the calendar 
year; the other figures are for the year ending June 30, 1860. 
The 12Cotton Ports" shown above include the export totals of 
lvJ:obile, Savannah, and Charleston. 
no 
TABLE 9 
CO~WARISON OF MANUFACTURES, BY SECTIONS, 186~-
No.oF Capital !Cost of No. of Annual Annual 
Section Estabs. invested raw mate- Hands cost of value of 
rial labor product 
(in millions)_ (in millions) 
New Eng. 20,671 ~p 257 ~~ 245 392,000 $ 104 $ 468 
Niddle 53,287 435 444 546,000 152 802 
West 36,785 194 225 210,000 63 384 
South 20,631 96 86 no,ooo 28 155 
Pacific 8,777 23 28 50,000 29 71 
Terr. 282 3 1 2,000 1 3 
Total U.S. 140,433 $1,009 ~pl,031 1,3ll,OOO $ 378 $1,885 
-l~Source: U.S.EJ..ghth Census, 1860, Vol. III, :Manufactures, p. 725. Dela-
ware and Maryland were classed with the 1\fiddle states; Kentucky, 
lvfissouri and Kansas were classed with the ~vestern states. 
TABLE 10 
LIST OF PRINCIPAL 141\.NUFACTURES, 1860, IN BALTIMORE CITY Al'iTI COUNTY 
ARRANGED IN ORDER OF THE ANNUAL VALUE OF PRODUCT-l*" 
Product No. of Capital Cost of No. of Annual Annual 
Estabs. invested raw mate- Hands cost of value of 
rial labor product 
(OOOts_) _(OOO's) lOOO'sl 
Clothing 128 $1,240 $1,889 5,900 $ 910 $ 3,208,000 
Cotton goods 12 1,584 1,258 1,900 435 3,130,000 
Flour & meal 41 562 2,518 150 52 3,045,000 
Sugar refin'g 2 250 2,200 175 60 2,300,000 
Provision~ 3A_ 860 1_,_111 1_.~_800 2_2_1 2_J017 .ooo 
Iron, total 24 1,248 1,093 1,300 440 1,974,000 
Hachinery 10 1,335 694 1,500 604 1,492,000 
Copper smelt'g 2 600 1,050 150 60 1,300,000 
Boots-shoes 268 226 374 1,400 360 912,000 
Cigars 127 216 238 500 11._6 672,000 
Liquors 28 225 433 167 53 639,000 
Ship bldg. 16 305 251 442 191 607,000 
Leather 21 360 393 121 41 559,000 
IJfa.rble,stone 13 169 251 247 86 560,000 
Furniture 39 267 1_25_ 475 1_2_0 538.000 
Bread 68 72 278 193 54 469,000 
'VJoolen goods 4 203 179 221 50 435,000 
Soap & candleslO 143 346 7i 23 433-,000 
Lumber 13 169 264 183 71 425,000 
Gas 1 1.100 132 230 84 375,000 
TOTAL 1,310 $13,789 $18,068 21,800 $5,353 $29,592,000 
. -l~Source: U.S.EJ..ghth Census, 1860, V61. III, Hanufacturmg, pp. 220-223. The 






COMPAHISON OF PRINCIPAL MANUFACTURES OF BALTIMORE CITY AND COUNTY 
WITH THOSE OF OTHER LEADING INDUSTRIAL CENTERS, 1860, 
ACCORDING TO ANNUAL VALUE OF PRODUCT-l~ 
- -(In MilJions of DolJars) 
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~ .. § 
0 :>:. .. !Jl • fl) 
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~ 
rl <>'3 ctl s:: •rl u fl) 0 ;::1 Q) :::> 
0 H Q) 
s:::::i .§~ 
;::1 H u..c: !Jl..C: 
.~ <0 0 '1:1 0 ..Ob.O X Q) (.) (!} 0 1>-1 ~ 0 0 1-i 
(J'J Q) (!}!-;> ~ ctl ~~ +li>.. 0 &~ .~·m ~~ fl) :;: 
Q) !Jl 
r-l+l :;: 0 ·rl • fl) Ill rei (J'J 




Total ~9. 5 159-1 34.2 135·9 37.6 46.9 27.6 ~6.5 27.9 ~0-9 4.4.6 
Clothing 3.2 22.3 .4 l2.0 5.2 6.5 .8 1.1 3.0 - ·4 
Cotton goods 3.1 - - 7.2 - ·4 .2 1.0 - 6.3 l2.2 
Flour & meal 3.0 2.6 .3 3.0 .1 1.8 5.0 1.3 - ·7 ·7 
Sugar refining 2.3 19.3 3.8 6.3 2.3 ·4 1.8 - - - -
Provisions 2.0 3.6 - 4.4_ .1 4-5 1.7 ·3 - - .1 
Iron, total 1.9 4.6 .4 4-3 3.1 1.7 1.5 5-3 .5 .2. .6 
I~chinery,engines 1.5 4.5 1.3 2.4 .9 2.0 1.5 1.0 .7 .5 ·9 
Copper smelting 1.3 -- - - .5 - - ·3 - - -
Boots & shoes .9 3.8 .3 5.4 .3 1.4 ·4 ·4 ·9 ~-5 9.2 
Cigars .6 1.1 .1 1.2 - .j .J .1 .2 .1 -
Liquors .6 3.2 3-4 3-4 1.1 4-7 1.7 ·7 ·9 .1 .3 
Shipbuilding .6 1.1 1.2 .3 .8 .2 - .1 - -4 .2 
Marble & stone .5 2.4 .4 1.0 .5 ·5 .1 - - - -
Leather .5 .l~ .1 2.1 .6 1.0 ·3 .4 2.7 3.9 2.5 
Furniture .5 3·9 .3 1.8 .9 2.5 .2 .2 .1 .2 ·5 
Bread ·4 3.3 1.1 2.0 ·5 .6 .2 .2 .2 .1 .3 
Woolen goods ·4 -- - 4.4 - -- - .1 ·5 5.6 3.2 
Soap & candles -4 1.8 .8 1.5 - 3.2 1.6 .6 .1 -3 .9 
Lumber .4 1.7 .3 ·5 .8 1.0 ·4 .8 ·9 .7 ·4 
Gas .3 3.8 .7 1.8 .6 ·3 ·4 .1 .1 .1 .1 
Cooperage ·3 .5 .5 -4 .1 ·4 -4 .1 - - .1 
Hides & tallow .3 - - .6 - - - - - - -
Paper ·3 1.0 .4 1.1 - .1 - - .3 .6 1.3 
Printing .3 ll.l .1 5.0 2.4 1.5 .2 ·5 .1 .1 .3 
Agiic. implements .2 - .2 .1 - .2 .1 .2 - - .1 
Carriages .2 •• 7 .1 1.1 .1 ·5 .1 .1 ·7 .2 .1 
Brick .2 - - 1.2 - .2 .6 .2 - - .3 
Saddlery,harness .2 .3 - ·9 .2 .1 .3 - 1.4 - -
Tin & metalware ·3 -7 .4 .6 .1 .4 ·3 .2 .2 .1 .1 
Hats & caps, etc. .1 1.0 1.6 1.4 .2 .2 - - 4.0 .6 -
·O 
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COMMODITIES 'rliANSPORTED EASTWARDLY TO BALTIMORE 
VIA BALTIMORE & OHIO R.R. MAIN STEM 
(EXCLUSIVE OF WASHINGTON BRANCH) 
Year ending September 30, 186~~ 
Amount Commodity Amount 











Lard and Butter 4,876 
l~al, etc. 4,747 
Cotton 3,534 
Leather 3,066 
\•Jhiskey Bark 2,629 
Lumber Wool 2,130 
Grain 
Tobacco (30,145 Hhds) 




Lard Oil 2,030 
Granite,lime,soap,limestrne 1,754 
All other 15,212 
Total 
~~Source: Baltimore & Ohio R. R., Annual Report, 1860, p. 105. 
TABLE 13 
COHt-:IODITIES TRANSPORTED EASTWARDLY TO BALTTI-lORE 
FROM THE OHIO RIVER TOWNS ONLY 
(THROUGH FREIGHT) 
Year ending September 30, 186~1-
Connnodity 
Flour (352,513 bbls) 
Pork & bacon 
Live Stock 
Whiskey (125,474 bblsl 
Tobacco (20,651 Hhds) 
Grain 
Lard & Butter 
Cotton (14,182 bales) 
Lard Oil 
\vool (14,359 bales) 
Leather 
All other 





















C01-1MODITIE3 TRANSPORTED ~VESTWARDLY FROM BALTIMORE 
VIA B.& O. HR TO ALL POINTS EAST OF OHIO RIVER 
(LOCAL FREIGHT) 
Commodity 




























































COMMODITIES TRANSPORTED W]STWARDLY FROM BALTIMORE 
VIA B. & 0. R. R. TO THE OI!IIO RIVER TO\.AJNS 
(THROUGH FREIGHT) 
(Year ending September 30, 1860)-lf 
Amount Commodity 
12,862 Syrup 
ll,557 Vehicles & Machinery 
8,696 Lead, tin, &c. 
Dtru.gs, oils, paints, etc. 7,077 Iron 
Sugar 6,291 China, glass, & Queensware 
Tobacco 3,751 Furniture 
Pig Iron 3,536 Narble 
Hardware 3,169 All other 
Fish 3,228 
Oysters 1,214 Total Through Freight 




































Maryland & D.C. 
Philadelphia 
Other Pa., Del., N. 
New York City 
Other New York 
Conn. & R. I. 
Boston 
Other 1'1ass. 
Maine & New Hamp. 
Total 
TABLE 16 
BALTIMOHE ARRIVALS, 1860~~ 
'teamers Ships Barks 
Foreign 
. . . ... . .. . . . ••• 7 . . . ••• 1 
10 1 23 
• • • ••• • •• ... 2 43 
••• • •• $ 
••• 1 8 
• • • 37 10 ... 6 4 
••• 1 1 
••• 3 ••• 
••• 33 6 
••• 20 13 
••• 3 6 
••• 4 2 
••• 1 • •• 
10 112 132 
Coastwise 
... ... 5 
45 ••• • •• 
27 ••• 4 
••• • •• • •• 
67 1 4 
30 4 2 
18 ••• ••• 
114 1 1 
• 2 • •• • •• 
99 7 15 
• • • ••• • •• 
6 ••• 1 
63 1 37 
••• • •• • •• 
••• • •• 1 
,471 14 70 
Schooners ( Total 
o.'jO -37 67 
58 61 126 
30 24 55 
45 30 109 
3 • •• 3 
16 3 64 
14 • •• 22 
2 1 12 
••• • •• 47 
••• • •• 10 
3 5 10 
3 • •• 6 
• •• • •• 39 
• •• • •• 33 
12 1 22 
• •• • •• 6 
• •• • •• 1 
216 162 632 
12 33 50 
1 20 66 
4 57 92 . .. 105 105 
8 164 244 
10 191 237 
1 35 54 
••• 57 173 
• •• 21 23 
3 288 412 
• •• 27 27 
1 92 100 
16 201 318 
1 95 96 
13 112 126 
70 1,498 2,123 
" .,,Sources: RR.RB, Vols. for 1860; Baltmore Pr1ce-Current, 1860. 
To 
























Haryland & D. c. 
Philadelphia 
Other Pa.,Del.,N.J. 
New York City 
Other New York 










1st earners Ships Bq_rks Brigs 
Foreign 
• •• 2 3 23 
••• • •• 8 65 
••• ••• • •• 27 
9 4 20 31 
••• ••• 2 • •• 
••• 2 J.,.l 10 
••• • •• 8 15 
••• 11 12 1 ... 1 3 14 
••• 2 2 1 
• • • 2 ••• 2 
••• 26 18 10 
••• 23 9 • •• 
••• 27 5 1 
••• 3 5 4 
••• 2 1 • •• 
••• 1 ••• • •• 
9 96 137 204 
Coastwise 
••• 3 6 6 
46 2 ••• 2 
35 ••• 9 8 
••• • •• ••• 1 
64 • • • ••• 3 
28 2 4 4 
18 ••• ••• 1 
115 1 1 ••• ... ••• . .. • •• 
100 5 2 6 
••• • •• • •• • •• 
6 ••• • •• • •• 
59 ••• 42 31 ... ... • •• 4 ... ••• 2 13 
••• 3 • •• 1 











































































ESTIMATED ANNUAL VALUE OF BALTDIORE'S PRINCIPAL TRADES, 186Q-;~­
(In Millions of Dollars) 
Trade Value Trade Value 
Dry Goods 30.0 Lumber 1.6 
Flour & grain 12,1 Foreign fruits 1.5 
Clothing, ready-made 7.0 Drugs, paints, &c. 1.5 
Sugar 7.0 Foreign wines,spirits 1.5 
Provisions 7.0 v\lhiskey 1.5 
Tobacco, leaf & mfrs. 6.8 Earthenware 1.2 
Oysters 4·5 Molasses 1.0 
Coffee 4.0 Cigars .8 
Hardware 4.0 Hat .7 
Boots and shoes 3.6 Soap & candles ·7 
Leather 3.9 Ship building .6 
Live Stock 3.8 Piano ·4 
Coal 3.1 Salted fish .3 
Guano 3.0 "V-lool ·4 
Books and papers 3.0 Tea ·3 
Cotton 2.6 Naval Stores .2 
Copper 2.5 Preserved fruit .2 
Iron 2.0 Salt .1 
-l!Source: "Principal Trades of Ba.l t:i.more, 11 Hunt's Her chants t 
Magazine, XLII (Yay, 1860), 565, quoting Baltimore 
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